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Abstract 
This thesis engages with two modern attempts at retrieving metaphysical reflection into the 
field of moral philosophy and thus to establish the possibility of interpreting human existence 
as a whole as morally qualified. On the one hand, the thesis engages with the Danish 
philosopher and theologian K. E. Løgstrup (1905-1981) and on the other, the British 
philosopher Iris Murdoch (1909-1999). Both thinkers claim that modern non-metaphysical 
moral philosophies (often inspired by natural science) are morally problematic and insist that 
a proper alternative is a moral philosophy which engages in the kind of metaphysical reflection 
that indicates an ontological affirmation of human existence as a whole. Furthermore, they 
insist that metaphysical interpretation is needed in order to understand the full scope of the 
moral condition of the human being and that such interpretation must be founded in 
phenomenological investigation of familiar, everyday experiences of moral goodness. The 
thesis engages with three main aspects of shared importance to both thinkers. It also emphasises 
an important recurrent difference in their understandings of the accomplishment of moral 
goodness, which both thinkers conceive of as love. The three shared aspects are 1) the 
continuous movement between empirical phenomenological investigation of everyday 
experiences of morality and the interpretation of these into a unified metaphysical framework; 
2) the idea of an absolute and ubiquitous moral demand as inherent in existence; and 3) the 
connection between human morality and religion. The recurrent difference regarding the idea 
of love and the accomplishment of moral goodness is analysed as the classical difference 
between Greek eros-love in Murdoch and Christian agape-love in Løgstrup, and it is claimed 
that this is the perhaps most decisive difference in the two thinkers, who initially seem to have 
a very similar approach – phenomenological – and reach similar conclusions regarding the 
nature of moral goodness as selfless love of the neighbour.  
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0.0 Introduction   
 
The problem about philosophy, and about life, is how to relate large impressive illuminating 
general conceptions to the mundane (“messing about”) details of ordinary personal private 
existence. But can we still use these great images, can they go on helping us? How do the 
generalizations of philosophers connect with what I am doing in my day-to-day and moment-
to-moment pilgrimage, how can metaphysics be a guide to morals? (MGM, 146). 
 
The quotation above is from Dame Iris Murdoch’s (1919-1999) principal philosophical work 
from 1992, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals. The questions it poses are also the questions to 
be investigated in this thesis. Murdoch is not the first philosopher to pose the question about 
the connection between the ‘muddle’ and incoherence in our day-to-day empirical experience 
of our world on the one hand, and the need for developing systematised and coherent theories 
of this empirical ‘muddle’ on the other. By bringing into dialogue two original moral 
philosophers – regrettably underexposed on the international scene – I aim in this study to shed 
light upon the often neglected connection between ethics and the need for unifying 
metaphysical reflection in ethical theorizing, with a special emphasis on the pre-ethical 
ontological prerequisites for the study of ethics in the first place. Iris Murdoch is one important 
advocate for this kind of awareness, and another is her Danish contemporary Knud Ejler 
Løgstrup (1905-1981). 
There are several good reasons for doing a comparative study of Løgstrup and 
Murdoch. This will be clear in the course of the study, but I shall initially point out the most 
important ones. First of all, these two thinkers pose very similar questions regarding human 
morality and in studying this field they both claim the importance of a combination of empirical 
day-to-day human experience and metaphysical reflection. Secondly, there has been a recent 
growing interest in the philosophical and theological resources in both Murdoch and Løgstrup. 
Although metaphysics might seem to many modern scholars a thing of the past, there has 
nevertheless recently been a growing interest in the work of both Løgstrup and Murdoch as 
part of a renewed interest in metaphysical reflection in, e.g., the study of ethics and philosophy 
of religion. The possible reasons for this will not be developed thoroughly in this study, but in 
a very broad sense one could say, as Charles Taylor has suggested, that there has recently been 
a renewed interest in the mystifying fact that some aspects of, or phenomena within, the field 
of ethics (and existential thought in general) require metaphysical interpretation and cannot be 
rationally explained (Taylor 1996, 3-5). In this regard, both Murdoch and Løgstrup claim to be 
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able to point out specific human experiences as indicators that existence is always already 
ethically qualified. Human morality is thus an ontological aspect of existence, and sovereign 
goodness in terms of an absolute authority is seen as occupying an unconditional and necessary 
place in human life.  
The nature of this unconditional goodness is, however, interpreted within two 
fundamentally different metaphysical frameworks, a Christian and a Platonic respectively. In 
this regard, William Schweiker has pointed out a similar aim in both Christianity and 
Platonism: both want to find a universal coherence between metaphysics (a view of reality) 
and ethics (Schweiker 1996, 211). The difference between a Platonic and a Christian inspired 
metaphysics is not a new discovery, but the philosophical and theological scene has changed 
dramatically in modernity, and metaphysical and universalist ethical theories are no longer 
natural starting points. This is what makes it interesting and important to study Murdoch’s and 
Løgstrup’s accounts of how these metaphysical frameworks are still relevant for us, and how 
they both claim that existence is morally qualified. Both Løgstrup and Murdoch write in an age 
after Kant’s Copernican turn, after Romanticism, and after the nihilistic atmosphere arising 
both as a result of general increasing confidence in science but also as a result of the horrors of 
World War II with the subsequent nihilism of French existentialism. These historical 
movements (among many others) influenced both Murdoch and Løgstrup greatly, and they 
both often refer to existentialism and the scientific ideal (especially within analytic philosophy) 
as major movements that resulted in a rejection of metaphysics in the study of human morality. 
As Schweiker points out, the modern individual no longer sees the world – including herself – 
as created in the image of God (or Good), and the value of things is not derived from their place 
in the divine order of things (Schweiker 1996, 217). Very broadly speaking, one could say that 
it became (and still is) common in ethical theory to start from what Løgstrup called a negative 
ontological point of departure. According to Løgstrup, negative ontology characterises several 
modern philosophical movements working without any metaphysical assumptions or 
interpretations regarding our basic existential (and thus also moral) condition. A non-
metaphysical ontological point of departure regarding the human ethical situation is (roughly) 
exemplified in Løgstrup’s article ‘Ethics and Ontology’ from 19601: “…I have been thrown 
into a world that is foreign to me and my aspirations, and I stand before the task of self-
sufficiently and freely supplying an outline according to which I want to live my life on the 
basis of a value system that I construct for myself” (ED, 272). In spite of their very different 
                                                        
1 The article has been included as an appendix in the English version of The Ethical Demand (1997). 
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philosophical backgrounds and ways of thinking, an explicit opposition to this kind of negative 
ontology is to be found in both Løgstrup and Murdoch, and this study is an attempt to illuminate 
their metaphysical counterarguments.  
Up until now, Løgstrup has by and large been unknown outside of Scandinavian 
contexts, and this thesis is thus also an attempt to bring his thought further onto the international 
academic scene. In terms of recent international interest in Løgstrup, his main work from 1956 
The Ethical Demand (Den Etiske Fordring) was translated into English in 1997 and has since 
received interest from prominent scholars such as Zygmunt Bauman and Alasdair MacIntyre. 
A brand-new English anthology of articles on Løgstrup’s moral philosophy arrived on the 
scene in 2017, engaging philosophers and theologians from both the continental and analytic 
philosophical traditions.2 As for Iris Murdoch, who has previously mainly been studied as 
novelist, she is currently beginning to be recognised in the field of philosophy and theology 
and studied as a serious moral philosopher and philosopher of religion.3  
 Although Løgstrup and Murdoch were contemporaries and often engaged in the same 
philosophical discussions of the time, there is no evidence of their awareness of each other. 
One obvious reason for Murdoch’s ignorance of Løgstrup is of course the fact that the work of 
Løgstrup was only available in Danish and was thus only discussed within Scandinavian 
contexts. Løgstrup’s ignorance of Murdoch is however not as obvious, and he often discussed 
contemporary debates in British moral philosophy in which Murdoch also took part.4   
 
0.1 Thesis and Methodology  
As already suggested above, this study is a comparative study between two contemporary 
thinkers working within the same field, with a shared interest, I suggest, in very similar 
fundamental questions about the nature of human morality. The aim is thus to bring these two 
thinkers into dialogue, which will hopefully result in fruitful discussions and shed new light 
upon each thinker, as well as upon the field of moral philosophy and philosophy of religion in 
a broader sense. In order to ensure a sensible comparative analysis, I have sought out what I 
take to be the three most important aspects common to Murdoch and Løgstrup’s work, about 
which I will circle throughout the study:  
                                                        
2 See (Stern and Fink (ed.) 2017) and https://ethicaldemand.wordpress.com 
3 See e.g. Antonaccio (2012). See also Broackes (ed.) (2012).  
4 Løgstrup discusses e.g. R. M. Hare’s moral philosophy in Norm og Spontanitet (Norm and Spontaneity) from 
1972; Murdoch also engages with Hare, e.g. in the essay The Idea of Perfection from 1962. 
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The first aspect is the movement between the particular and irreducible individual or 
situation on the one hand, and the emphasis on the necessity of metaphysical reflections on the 
human condition on the other. This double focus is explicit in both thinkers, despite the 
differences regarding their respective philosophical interlocutors; Løgstrup mainly follows 
Kierkegaard, Luther, Heidegger, and Lipps, whereas Murdoch follows Plato, Freud, Kant, and 
to some extent Sartre.5 The depiction of philosophy as a constant ‘two-way-movement’ 
between empiricism and metaphysics was suggested by Murdoch herself, and its importance 
for Murdoch has been critically analysed by Maria Antonaccio (2012, 32-43). This is a helpful 
approach to both thinkers, because it clarifies the central theme of the thesis: the connection 
between the concrete ethical situation and its placement within a broader metaphysical 
framework. Furthermore, the two-way-movement is what enables both thinkers to frame the 
full scope of human morality and at the same time avoid constructing any totalizing dogmatic 
systems. The nature of the metaphysical framework is interpretative and remains ultimately 
inconclusive, and it must always be tested against actual human experiences of morality.  
The second aspect regards the moral realism of both thinkers. Following Løgstrup’s 
terminology, I suggest that the idea of an inherent ‘ethical demand’ is to be found in the thought 
of both, although Murdoch’s formulation in terms of a ‘moral quest’ in many respects differs 
from that of Løgstrup. Nevertheless, I suggest that the metaphysical background picture in both 
thinkers implies an absolute and ubiquitous ethical demand to the individual. A striking 
similarity between the two thinkers is the content of the demand, which is a demand for selfless 
love of the other person, but this ultimately refers back to either God (Løgstrup) or the Good 
(Murdoch). As we shall see, Løgstrup focuses on interpersonal love as already given in the 
immediate encounter, whereas Murdoch focuses on the Platonic idea of the individual 
pilgrimage towards love of the other as an irreducible reality.  
The third aspect is the religious aspect of ethics, which is important because of the 
obvious religious connotations connected to both the Christian and Platonic metaphysical 
framework. However, in this regard there is an important and clear distinction between the 
term ‘religious’ and specific religious movements, e.g. ‘Christianity’ or ‘Buddhism’. Løgstrup 
insists that there is no such thing as ‘Christian ethics’, although he suggests the obvious 
possibility of a Christian religious interpretation of the morally qualified human condition. As 
we shall see, the difference between Christian ethics and a religious interpretation of human 
                                                        
5 Løgstrup also discusses Sartre, but he does not adopt the same focus on consciousness as Murdoch does in her 
moral philosophy.  
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morality is crucial. Murdoch also suggests that human morality ultimately has religious 
connotations, but these are not restricted to a specific world religion. Being a declared atheist, 
Murdoch rejects Christian theism and, as we shall see, her modern retrieval of Plato instead 
connotes, I suggest, a kind of atheistic spirituality.  
 Many other connections and dissimilarities could be found, but these three points are 
sufficient for this thesis, as they represent, I suggest, the most important cornerstones in the 
two interpretations of human morality. Also, a reading with this focus emphasises the 
complexity of the two thinkers, for whom it was crucial to avoid any fixed systems or theories, 
but who still remained aware of the importance of metaphysical reflection – no one can avoid 
taking a stand in this regard, and there are no neutral ones in the field of human morality! Thus, 
according to both thinkers, any philosophical dream of a neutral investigation of morals as a 
kind of (natural) scientific field is impossible and is at best an instance of self-deception.6  
 Over the course of the investigation of the connection between ethics and ontology in 
Murdoch and Løgstrup, I shall use the above-mentioned distinction between non-metaphysical 
and metaphysical ontology suggested by Løgstrup himself (ED, 272). The distinction has 
further been demonstrated as an effective approach to interpretation by Svein Aage 
Christoffersen (Christoffersen 2017, 170). Løgstrup also calls his metaphysical ontology 
‘affirmative ontology’ as opposed to negative non-metaphysical ontologies, such as we see in, 
e.g., Sartre, which he calls negative ontology: “One could call the first possibility an 
ontological affirmation, the second an ontological negation (or anthropological affirmation)” 
(ED, 272). I suggest that this distinction is sufficient in this context, because it clarifies how 
metaphysical ontology is a general structure in both Murdoch and Løgstrup. The affirmative 
ontology as a point of departure also underlies both their moral realism and their connections 
of ethics to religious interpretation.  
With the seemingly strong emphasis on metaphysics, it remains crucial to clarify that 
the focus of the investigation of the connection between ethics and metaphysics will mainly be 
its anthropological dimension and will not include any separate systematic analyses of 
metaphysics in itself. This is because the metaphysical aspect of ethics argued for by Murdoch 
and Løgstrup is in no way unambiguously dogmatic or detached from the human being; the 
central interest in both thinkers remains the human situation as morally qualified – this 
qualification requiring metaphysical reflection. Thus, the metaphysical frameworks rather 
serve as important and decisive background pictures for the human interpretation of the ethical 
                                                        
6 Charles Taylor has named this the inescapability of ‘strong evaluations’ in the study of ethics (Taylor 1989, 32). 
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condition, and it remains crucial for both to state that metaphysical reflection must be adequate 
imaginative interpretation of the human condition rather than dogmatic speculation 
(Antonaccio 2012, 4; Christoffersen 2017, 181). Regarding Løgstrup, this renders what is often 
referred to as his anthro-phenomenological work – often associated with his early work – the 
focal point of the investigation. The focus is thus on his conception of interpersonal ethical 
phenomena, the Sovereign Expressions of Life, rather than the full scope of the cosmo-
phenomenological or fundamental ontological investigations of the later four volumes on 
metaphysics. Among the later works I shall only engage with Skabelse og Tilintetgørelse 
(Creation and Annihilation) from 1978 because of its important discussion of the connection 
between ethics, metaphysics, and religion. The fundamental question in Løgstrup’s ethics was 
and remains the interpersonal situation and the question about how I should relate to the other 
person when a part of his or her life is laid in my hands (Fink 2007, 48). Regarding Murdoch, 
I shall follow the same line as in the readings of Løgstrup and focus mainly on the 
anthropological implications of her metaphysical deliberations rather than the separate 
cosmological implications of her connection of metaphysics and ethics. As in the investigation 
of Løgstrup, I engage with Murdoch’s Platonic metaphysics in order to understand the human 
situation.  
 
0.2 Structure  
The thesis is divided into two parts, of which the first part is the longest, as it engages with two 
of the three aspects mentioned above. Thus, the first part of the thesis investigates Løgstrup’s 
and Murdoch’s conceptions of the human self as part of the larger structure of a morally 
qualified existence. The analysis corresponds with the first two aspects of the overall analysis 
and thus illuminates the two-way-movement between the empirical phenomena of human 
experience and how the human being is always already subject to a moral demand in its 
inevitable relation to a moral absolute. The second part of the thesis investigates the important 
question about the religious connotations in Murdoch’s and Løgstrup’s accounts of human 
morality, and it thus illuminates the third aspect of the overall analysis.  
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PART I  
Metaphysical Frameworks of the Moral Self  
This part of the thesis will illuminate the metaphysical background pictures of the two thinkers' 
ethical thinking. What characterises both Løgstrup’s and Murdoch’s approaches to 
metaphysics, as mentioned above, is their awareness of the dangers of proposing any fixed 
systems or theories within the field of ethics (Aaboe Sørensen 2014; Antonaccio 2012).7 What 
will be clear, especially in Løgstrup’s Lipps-inspired phenomenology, is the interpretative 
approach to metaphysics in both thinkers. Metaphysics is not to be understood in any classical 
dogmatical or ‘substantial’ sense, but as phenomenological interpretation of certain ethical 
experiences that indicate specific fundamental structures of existence (Thomassen 2005, 118). 
Following the emphasis on the two-way-movement in the introduction, this part of the thesis 
will illuminate both the underlying metaphysical frameworks and the anthropological 
implications these have for the moral self, which inevitably form the point of departure in moral 
reflection. Furthermore, this part will also shed light on the idea of an absolute moral demand 
in both Murdoch and Løgstrup, who both claim to find a demand of selfless love of the 
neighbour, but do so on very different terms regarding both their metaphysical framework and 
anthropological presuppositions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
7 It is worth noting here that it is of course not a unique feature of Murdoch and Løgstrup to work in a continuous 
movement between empirical analysis and theory or, in other words, between phenomenological analysis and 
metaphysics in the study of ethics. Metaphysical reflection in ethics in modern philosophy, employing a similar 
strategy to Løgstrup and Murdoch, is also to be found in, e.g., Emmanuel Levinas. Engaging with Levinas would 
exceed the scope of this study. Zygmunt Bauman has provided an enlightening juxtaposition of Løgstrup and 
Levinas (Bauman 2007, 231-61). 
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K. E. Løgstrup 
1.0 The Ethical Demand 
This chapter considers the structure of Løgstrup’s idea of a specific ethical demand that can be 
derived from our immediate experience of interpersonal reality (ED, 17). This idea is 
elaborated in ED, mainly through an in-depth analysis of the phenomenon of trust (Dan. 
‘tillid’). According to Løgstrup, trust instantiates the interdependent structure of our social 
lives, and, as we shall see, interdependence is exactly what makes up the foundation of our 
ethical lives. Although Løgstrup first uses the term in the later publication Kunst og Etik (Eng. 
Art and Ethics) from 1961, the idea of interdependence is already to be found in the analyses 
of ED (Rabjerg 2017, 94).  Furthermore, it is a central idea in Løgstrup’s moral philosophy that 
the phenomenon of trust, inherent in existence itself and a key part of fundamental human 
experience, contains a radical, one-sided and silent ethical demand, directed towards every 
single individual.  
I begin with an outline of the content of the ethical demand as it is expounded in ED, 
in order to then give an account of how this demand presupposes a specific ontology and 
anthropology. The formulation of the ethical demand begins with an analysis of the empirical 
dimension of the demand, which is the fact that we are always already, to some extent, holding 
some of our neighbour’s life in our hand in the particular encounter – and vice versa. Whereas 
other philosophers and theologians, e.g. Kierkegaard and Murdoch, begin their investigations 
with the moral self, characteristically Løgstrup’s point of departure is not the isolated self and 
its relation to itself mediated through a relation to an absolute moral authority. Instead he takes 
a phenomenological approach in his investigation of what he suggests is an ethically 
constituted phenomenon present between me and the other person. Ethics is always 
interpersonal, and Løgstrup claims that a phenomenon like trust is pre-reflectively always 
already experienced as a phenomenon that has a moral claim on us (ED, 18).  
In order to avoid misunderstandings, a brief specification of Løgstrup’s 
phenomenological approach is needed. Løgstrup’s strategy follows Heidegger and Lipps8 in 
the sense that it is the ontological interpretation of experienced phenomena which make up the 
results of the investigation. Løgstrup is thus not working on any strictly logical or scientific 
                                                        
8 References to Lipps occur frequently in the footnotes of ED, see. e.g. p. 33 (footnote 1), p. 65, p. 67 and p. 193. 
There are no direct references to Heidegger in ED, but I suggest that the reference is clear from the particular type 
of phenomenological approach, which follows central ideas in Heidegger, along with the reflections on Heidegger 
in his book on Heidegger and Kierkegaard published prior to ED: Kierkegaards und Heideggers Existenzanalyse 
und ihr Verhältnis zur Verkündigung, (Løgstrup, 2013 [1950]). My claim is further backed up by Hans Fink and 
Alasdair MacIntyre in their introduction to the English version of ED. 
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basis, but, in a similar way to Heidegger, he wants to investigate the pre-scientific structure of 
ethical phenomena. As Patrick Stokes writes, Løgstrup appeals in his investigation to the 
phenomenologically given goodness inherent in phenomena like trust; he does not refer to any 
independent conception of the good, but instead claims that ontologically – i.e. in the way the 
phenomenon presents itself in our experience of it – the goodness of trust is simply self-evident 
(Stokes 2017, 282).  
I return now to the analysis of trust. Løgstrup writes: “It is a characteristic of human 
life that we normally encounter one another with natural trust. This is true not only in the case 
of persons who are well acquainted with one another but also in the case of complete strangers” 
(ED, 8). It is important here to notice how Løgstrup refers to trust as an aspect of human life 
rather than an aspect of human nature. Here we see the first implication of the claim that trust 
is something always already given that happens between us, rather than a virtue of the will. 
This has important implications for Løgstrup’s anthropology, but for now it is sufficient to 
notice how Løgstrup emphasises that trust is a crucial precondition for the very possibility of 
human communication. Without trust, human communication would be impossible: 
“…initially we trust one another. This may indeed seem strange, but it is a part of what it means 
to be human. Human life could hardly exist if it were otherwise.” (ED, 8). But, he claims, there 
is always a risk connected to trusting. When we attend to someone, we trust the other person 
to be open and receiving but we run the risk of not being met and thus of our immediate trust 
being destroyed: “To trust, however, is to lay oneself open. This is why we react vehemently 
when our trust is “abused”, as we say, even though it may have been only in some 
inconsequential matter” (ED, 9). Trust underlies all communication and is, in principle, always 
there before any human discrediting of it.  When communication fails, it is because one or both 
parts were not met in their need – or at least did not feel as if they were – when a part of their 
lives was handed over to the other. This also stresses Rabjerg’s point that interdependence is 
fundamental in Løgstrup; we are always already ‘handed over’ to our neighbour and vice versa 
and it is a fundamental aspect of human life that we are in each other’s power (Rabjerg 2017, 
97). In this way, Løgstrup suggests, conflicts which we normally explain as originating from 
someone breaking a social rule, which often occur when two different worldviews collide, are 
often reactions to something far more elementary, that is, the disappointment and pain 
occurring when one is not met in one’s trust in the other to receive properly what one has 
handed over of oneself to his or her power: “There is a third reason why the conflict vents itself 
in moral accusations. It must at all costs never become apparent to the other person, and 
preferably not even to ourselves, that it is a matter of disappointed expectation, because though 
14 
 
we have been exposed we are at pains not to admit it” (ED, 11). This also indicates the selfless 
nature of the proper care of the part of the neighbour that one has been given in the specific 
encounter – as soon as I use the other’s trust for my own purpose, trust has been turned into 
self-indulgence. 
To elaborate the phenomenologically developed idea of the elementary character of 
trust, Løgstrup exemplifies how trust is not merely something we choose to show, but 
something always already deeply interwoven in the structure of life. Trust is there before we 
get the chance to reflect upon it. When we contemplate other people on our own, we often tend 
to think about them as having a certain character or as being ‘this kind of person’. Sometimes 
we might even think of others with hostility and be annoyed by something we attribute to them. 
However, Løgstrup suggests, our more or less fixed ideas of others mostly seem to alter and 
‘open up’ the moment we see them face-to-face – unless we have a very strong reason to dislike 
a person no matter what:  
 
Why does the picture break down? This is a difficult question to answer, because what happens 
in this connection is something basic, something anterior to all morality and convention. An 
adequate account is impossible. […] To associate with or encounter personally another person 
always means to be “in the power of” his or her words and conduct. Psychology refers to this 
as the power of suggestion. […] But it is even more basic than this. Not to let the other person 
emerge through words, deeds and conduct, but to hinder this instead by our suspicion […] is a 
denial of life. It is the very nature of human existence that it does not want to be reduced to 
reactions – even wise reactions – which are determined solely by what has already happened. 
It is in the very nature of human existence that it wants to be just as new as the other person’s 
new words, new deeds, and new conduct. […] We might call this a trust in life itself, in the 
ongoing renewal of life (ED, 13-14). 
 
This passage is crucial in several regards. First of all, it illuminates the pre-moral status 
Løgstrup ascribes to trust. As Stokes (2017, 282) remarked, the goodness of trust is 
ontologically founded, and it must be understood as a phenomenon occurring before any human 
construction of moral conventions. It thus clarifies Løgstrup’s phenomenological approach 
mentioned above. To use Heidegger’s terminology from Sein und Zeit, trust must be 
understood here on an ontological level, which precedes the ontic level of scientific 
psychology.9 Lastly, the passage further supports the idea that trust is a phenomenon belonging 
                                                        
9 See, e.g., Sein und Zeit §10  
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to life itself in the sense that it is interwoven in the continuous renewal of life. It almost 
resembles Dasein’s continuous ‘becoming’ qua the inherent modes of existence 
(Existentialien) in Heidegger. However, trust in Løgstrup is not merely Dasein’s mode of 
existence, I contend, but a mode of life itself that establishes human interdependence as 
fundamental and shows how the continuous renewal of life happens through trust as an external 
and morally qualified phenomenon. Thought of in this way, trust is a phenomenon working 
through us as an existential modus of continuous becoming (Dan. ‘fornyelse’), and not as a 
function of the human will. The parallel made to Heidegger is in line with Løgstrup’s own 
engagement with Heidegger both in his early and later work.10  
A natural critique of this categorisation of trust is to suggest that the same could be said 
of the opposite phenomenon of mistrust. One could say that it is possible to experience mistrust 
as something which simply happens without one actually wanting to mistrust the other person. 
To this Løgstrup answers in a footnote: “Trust and distrust are not two parallel ways of life. 
Trust is basic; distrust is the absence of trust. This is why we do not normally advance 
arguments and justifications for trust as we do for distrust. To use a modern philosophical 
expression, distrust is the “deficient form” of trust” (ED, 18). The idea of mistrust as a deficient 
modus is in keeping with Stokes’ point that, in Løgstrup, the fundamental goodness of life is 
ontologically verified through phenomenological analysis, whereas, as we shall see shortly, 
evil, including a phenomenon like mistrust, is not an ontological part of life itself but can only 
be ascribed to the human will. As Rabjerg points out, Løgstrup admits that to claim that trust 
is an ontological aspect of life itself and mistrust is a human fabrication is a metaphysical 
interpretation (Rabjerg 2017, 103; ED, 140). However, if we claim that trust is our own 
accomplishment, we turn it into self-indulgence, and the evident inherent goodness of trust as 
something given and thus selfless vanishes – trust is there before the self-will (Rabjerg 2017, 
103). In ED, Løgstrup adds another important feature to the interpretation of trust, claiming 
that the analysis further indicates that the given goodness of trust is a ‘gift of life’ that we must 
continuously receive: “Inherent in the insight that trust and love are not of our making is the 
understanding that life as a whole, our very existence, is a gift which we have received” (ED, 
140). We have not ourselves created our life, and we live on what has been given us before we 
willed or created anything ourselves (ED, 19-20). The idea of life as a gift is thus the foundation 
of Løgstrup’s affirmative ontology, and ultimately one must accept the gift-metaphor 
                                                        
10 For the early engagement with Heidegger see Løgstrup (2013 [1950]). For the later engagement see, e.g., the 
analysis of time in Skabelse og Tilintetgørelse (Creation and Annihilation), 2015.  
16 
 
connected to the interpretation of trust to fully follow Løgstrup’s analysis of human morality 
(Christoffersen 2017, 182-83). Løgstrup has in this regard referred to his ethics as ‘ontological’ 
as opposed to deontological and teleological ethics (Løgstrup 2014, 12; ED, 171). As 
Christoffersen has pointed out, Løgstrup’s classification of his own ethics as ‘ontological’ does 
not mean he suggests that other types of ethical theories do not have any ontology. What 
Løgstrup is anxious to stress is that his position is – in opposition to modern types of 
teleological and deontological ethics – based on an ‘ontological affirmation’ where the 
ontology of existence as a whole is interpreted as morally qualified (Christoffersen 2017, 170). 
This is what he shows, I suggest, with the metaphysical interpretation of life as a gift. 
Furthermore, Løgstrup insists that his ethics is formulated in purely human terms, which means 
that although he draws on several Christian (Lutheran) insights in the course of his analysis of 
human morality, he insists that they depict universal and fundamental features of existence. 
This means that they must be understood as metaphysical insights that do not belong to one 
specific religion (ED, 1-5). I investigate Løgstrup’s conception of religion in more detail in the 
second part of the thesis.  
Firstly, however, it is important to analyse how Løgstrup connects the analysis of trust 
and human interdependence to the idea of an absolute ethical demand. On the basis of the 
analysis of trust and the givenness of life, Løgstrup goes on to claim that there is an absolute, 
universal, and inescapable ethical demand inherent therein, which demands of me to take care 
of the part of the life of the other person which is handed over to me in our specific and 
historically contingent encounter. Because trust is the foundation of interpersonal life and 
constitutes the foundation of our mutual interdependence, life contains an inherent demand to 
take care of the part of his or her life with which I have been trusted – entirely for his or her 
sake and with no regard to my own wishes or needs. According to Alasdair MacIntyre, there 
are six important characteristics of the demand (Macintyre 2017, 259). I follow MacIntyre’s 
instructive short outline, adding a seventh point about the unfulfillability of the demand, which 
he leaves out.  
First of all, the demand is silent and invisible. It is an unspoken demand from life itself, 
occurring through the fact that trust lays parts of other people’s lives in our hands in varying 
degrees at various times. It is thus not a demand we can make on each other, and there are no 
guidelines as to how the demand should be fulfilled: “It is of the essence of the demand that 
with such insight, imagination, and understanding as he or she possesses a person must figure 
out for him or herself what the demand requires” (ED, 22). It is worth noticing Løgstrup’s 
choice of formulation regarding the idea that a part of the other’s life is laid in one’s hands; it 
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is not a willed action of the other to be, to some extent, at my mercy, but this is simply a 
fundamental structure of life.  
Secondly, the demand is radical and ubiquitous. It is demanded that I obey it in the 
sense that I unselfishly help my neighbour, no matter who my neighbour is and what situation 
we are in (ED, 44). This reflects the classical Christian (Lutheran) idea of neighbour-love. 
Løgstrup describes the demand as radical, because of its one-sided and silent nature, which 
demands that I take care of my neighbour entirely for his or her sake, without any prescriptions 
as to how this is to be done (ED, 44). In this way it conflicts with our own situation – we do 
not immediately care unconditionally for strangers – and we often (more or less consciously) 
take some kind of reciprocity into account when we help others. Therefore, we compromise 
with the demand through social norms. Social norms often yield specific advice as to how one 
is expected to deal with a specific situation, and they thus delimit situations so that one can 
‘get it over with’. This is however not the case regarding the absolute and ubiquitous demand. 
One is never ‘done’ with one’s neighbour, and one can never be entirely sure whether one did 
the best one could in a situation: “Here [regarding the demand] there is no prevailing norm to 
guide us. The fact out of which the demand arises, namely, that his or her life is more or less 
in my hands, is a fact which has come into being independently of either him or her or me” 
(ED, 46).  
Thirdly, it is emphasised that I am demanded to do what is best for the other. This is 
not to be mistaken for what the other person might want. It is left to me to estimate what he or 
she needs – to the best of my ability – and in this way to “…free the other person from his or 
her confinement and to give his or her vision the widest possible horizon” (ED, 27). A beggar 
on the street might want money from me, but this does not mean that this is what is best for 
her. It is my task to estimate what I can do to help her by carefully attending to what would in 
fact help her (not me or my conscience) and then to act accordingly. In this way, the ideal 
moral agent acts selflessly and is fully occupied with the needs of the other. This is initially 
strikingly similar to Murdoch’s idea of the selfless moral agent who attends to the other person, 
although there are decisive differences regarding the metaphysical background picture.  
Fourthly, I must take the established social norms into account. Although they can be 
used to compromise with the demand in a way that leads to indifference, this is not necessarily 
the case. The social norms also have a positive and necessary role in our social lives in the 
sense that helping the other person must take place within a social form. The silent demand 
must be mediated through social norms in order to avoid self-indulgent sentimentality and 
immodesty (ED, 19). As we shall also see in Murdoch, Løgstrup suggests that the ‘will to form’ 
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is an elementary part of human existence which contrasts with the immediate formlessness of 
the silent demand of neighbour-love. All our relations with others are characterised by the fact 
that they are mediated through human forms of language and norms for social behaviour, and 
thus the social norms can function as the medium through which the demand demands to be 
fulfilled. As Fink mentions, we need the norms in order for our social lives to function – life 
without social form is unbearable and would most likely be a horrible affair (Fink 2007, 55).11 
Despite the need for form however, it is crucial to remember that the demand cannot be reduced 
to social norms. The demand is a ‘demand of love’ (ED, 21), and as such it underlies every 
human encounter as timeless and universal. On the other hand, we also inevitably live with 
various other demands based on common sense norms of social justice. Løgstrup’s point is that 
in this regard the demand of selfless care of the other is much more fundamental, and as such 
it makes up the unifying aspect of human morality, which is then refracted through the forms 
of human social norms (Fink 2017, 71). It is thus important for Løgstrup to state that in obeying 
the demand, one might have to act against the social norms, although one cannot, of course, 
justify this directly by reference to a universal demand of love. The demand remains silent, and 
the agent is alone responsible for his or her actions. As we shall see later, the idea of moral 
unity within human existence is also what permeates Murdoch’s philosophy. 
Fifthly, although the demand is radical it is not limitless. One should never take over 
the whole responsibility for the other person (or a whole people for that matter), although it 
might be tempting to interpret the demand to mean that one can claim to have an absolute 
power to decide what is best for the other: “We cannot intrude upon his or her individuality 
and will, upon his or her personhood, in the same way that we can affect his or her emotions 
and in some instances even his or her destiny” (ED, 26). In much the same way, fulfilling the 
demand is not equal to sacrificing oneself – helping one’s neighbour to flourish is not the same 
as neglecting one’s own life and individuality. It is rather a careful assessment of what one can 
reasonably do to help – to remember (also) to take care of oneself is not necessarily selfish 
(ED, 137-38). 
 Sixthly, and this is connected to point four, obeying the demand is not the same as 
following a rule. At this point Løgstrup objects to the rigidity of Kantian and other types of 
rule-based ethical systems. What is important to point out here is Løgstrup’s strong emphasis 
on the particularity of the situation together with the emphasis on genuine love as motivation 
                                                        
11 For a thorough investigation of the complementarity between the demand and the social norms see, e.g., Fink 
(2017). 
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for helping the other – raising a child in strict accordance with the norms of child-raising but 
without love is of no help to the child (ED, 62). The particularity of the situation must precede 
any set of moral rules, although social norms very often guide us in deciding what to do (ED, 
58-59). Very often situations demand personal judgment and here it is impossible to refer only 
to norms and rules: “Here motive is often very influential in determining whether or not our 
obedience to the social norms will really be of help to a person” (ED, 61).  
 
1.1 Negative Anthropology 
The last characteristic of the demand concerns the unfulfillability of the demand and deserves 
a more extensive elaboration, because it reveals decisive anthropological presuppositions in 
Løgstrup. The unfulfillability of the demand is clear from the fact that what the demand 
demands cannot be willed. As we have seen, the trust and love which the demand demands is 
always already there prior to our willed actions. It is only in mistrust that we discover the lack 
of trust which should have been there. What the demand demands is thus to be superfluous, 
and here it is important to emphasise a decisive feature of the demand: it is, according to 
Løgstrup, more important to stress that it is unselfishness which is demanded, rather than 
stressing that unselfishness is demanded (Fink 2010, 523). The curious thing is the fact that 
unselfishness cannot be willed without self-will, but it is exactly the destruction of self-will 
that the demand demands: “In a sense, our attempts at obedience actually work against the 
demand, for every attempt at obedience is an expression of that which the demand opposes, 
namely, the will to be sovereign in our own life” (ED, 146). The metaphysical assertions about 
life and especially human nature underlying this passage make up the theme of what follows. 
The unfulfillability reveals the negative anthropology in Løgstrup in strong contrast to his 
affirmative ontology, and in ED the negative anthropology seems to render the demand 
unfulfillable at any time: “The self brings everything under the power of its selfishness. Man’s 
will is in its power; addressed to our will, the demand to love is an impossible demand” (ED, 
141).12 As we shall see, it is exactly the human will that renders the demand unfulfillable. 
In spite of this, Løgstrup’s claim that the demand is unfulfillable has been criticised, 
e.g. by MacIntyre, who writes: “Løgstrup’s account is flawed. The notion that we can be 
required to respond to a demand that is always and inevitably unfulfillable is incoherent. If I 
say to you ‘This cannot be done; do it’, you will necessarily be baffled” (MacIntyre 2007, 164). 
                                                        
12 This view is later modified and specified with the introduction of the sovereign expressions of life, but in this 
paragraph I focus on ED and the negative anthropology connected to the unfulfillability of the radical demand. 
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MacIntyre’s view has however been criticised by a number of other Løgstrup scholars (Stokes 
2017; Martin 2017; Stern 2017) and drawing on their recent critical objections to MacIntyre’s 
view along with Svend Andersen’s illuminating demonstration of the connection between 
Løgstrup and Luther, I will emphasise the necessity of a close investigation of the 
metaphysical, ontological, and relevant anthropological presuppositions connected to 
Løgstrup’s claim.  
First of all, unfulfillability is directly connected to the Lutheran anthropology taken up 
by Løgstrup (Andersen 2007, 70-73). Along with the persistent emphasis on the fact that life 
has been given to us, in the sense that we do not owe our own existence to ourselves, Løgstrup 
claims that, because of the evil human will, our life ‘ethically speaking consists in 
contradiction’ (ED, 165).13 The negative anthropology present in ED is not obvious from the 
beginning, but it becomes more and more evident further on. In the chapter ‘Is there a Christian 
Ethics?’ Løgstrup explains that the ethical demand is always ‘refracted’ by three dimensions 
of our lives. On a general level, the demand is refracted through the fact that we are always 
already entangled with one another through interpersonal relationships. Secondly, and more 
specifically, the demand is refracted by the specific situation in which I am standing now, face 
to face with my neighbour. Both of these dimensions represent the given condition of our lives, 
namely the fact that we are handed over to each other in trust and that, through trust as 
ontologically good in itself, life naturally suggests that we take care of our neighbour. These 
two dimensions of refraction thus correspond with the goodness inherent in life itself, and 
Løgstrup says as follows: “It is important that these various relationships not oppose the 
demand but point in the same direction that it does. Through each one of them […] the 
individual holds something of the other person’s life in his hands” (ED, 107). The last 
dimension by which the demand is refracted is the ’nature of the individual’. In this regard, 
however, Løgstrup claims, with reference to Luther, that human nature goes directly against 
the demand:  
 
Beyond all this, the demand is also refracted by a person’s own nature, and that nature does not 
elicit the same actions that the demand does. Indifference and apathy make a person 
unimaginative. Self-assertion and desire to get ahead distort the fact from which the demand 
emerges. […] Briefly stated, while the radical demand is furthered when it is refracted by the 
                                                        
13 The distinction between life as ‘given’ and life as a ’gift’ is important, because the latter connotes the religious 
idea of a ‘giver’. Whether one is religious or not, Løgstrup claims that the givenness of life understood in strictly 
human terms is sufficient for the phenomenological validity of the demand (Fink 2015, 521). 
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unique relationships in which we live our lives, it is hindered in its course when it is refracted 
by our nature (ED, 108).  
 
In a footnote to this paragraph Løgstrup refers directly to Luther: “It is the fundamental idea in 
Luther’s ethic of vocation which I have been trying to express here, though without employing 
either his detailed development of it or his language” (ED, 108). Thus Løgstrup takes up 
Luther’s basic idea, although without the specific and detailed historical context of Luther’s 
idea. Furthermore, as Andersen remarks, it is important to remember that the term ‘nature’ in 
this context cannot be understood biologically, but must be understood in accordance with 
Luther’s thought that we must take the unfulfillability on us as our own fault. Theologically 
speaking, Løgstrup is thus working with the idea of radical guilt (Andersen 2007, 72-73). 
Human selfishness and self-assertion must be understood in a radical sense, which means that 
it is the will itself which is evil and gives everything it encounters a selfish form: “Or, stated in 
other words, what we spoke of a moment ago as a human being’s personal “account” is really 
his or her will, and the radical character of guilt consists in the fact that it is the human will 
which is selfish and evil” (ED,  141).  
Løgstrup elsewhere suggests that the selfishness ascribed to human nature is also what 
leads to our resistance to the demand. As mentioned above, we normally count on some degree 
of reciprocity in all our social relations, and this can lead to a total dismissal of the view that 
life must be received as something given (ED, 115). Instead, we conclude that if we have a 
responsibility for the other person, the same is the case the other way around. But according to 
Løgstrup, this can never be the case. Included in the worldview of the ethical demand, the 
individual has been given his or her life and cannot, in principle, demand anything in life as his 
or her right: “…life and all that it contains has been given us, and there is nothing in our life 
to justify our making a counterdemand upon another person” (ED, 116). If we reject the 
demand with the inherent view that life is something given and must be received unselfishly 
as such, we make ourselves sovereign of our own lives. But, according to Løgstrup, this cannot 
be true, because the human being did not create itself, and he or she “…possesses nothing 
which he or she has not received as gift” (ED, 116). 
From Løgstrup’s chapter in ED on the possible destructive character of the demand, it 
is possible to derive the important difference between human nature in its metaphysically 
qualified Lutheran-ontological sense and what has been translated as the ‘natural basis’, which 
is human nature in its non-metaphysical biological sense. As Andersen has drawn attention to, 
one can easily confuse the Lutheran sense of the term with the more common-sense biological 
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sense of the word. The difference has been pointed out by Løgstrup himself in terms of the 
alternation between ‘human nature’ and ‘natural basis’, and it is important to have the term 
‘natural basis’ in mind in connection with Løgstrup’s deliberations on the role of what he names 
‘natural love’ vis-á-vis the ethical demand. Natural love is, e.g., what is seen between parents 
and children: “Where natural love prevails between two people, the lives of both are successful 
[…] If parents take care of their children and bring them up wisely, there is a good chance not 
only that the children will succeed, but that the parents will also” (ED, 124). One might thus 
immediately think that in close human relationships, borne by natural love and care for the 
other, the demand is fulfilled and thus superfluous. Løgstrup admits that the reciprocity 
involved in natural love does not initially seem to contradict to the one-sidedness of the ethical 
demand, because the parts are so closely entangled in mutual love: “The action to which natural 
love moves a person is therefore motivated by the fact that it serves both his or her flourishing 
and our own. These two concerns simply cannot be separated from each other” (ED, 125). In 
this way, Løgstrup suggests: “…it is hard to see why natural love should in this respect be 
regarded as contrary to the one-sided demand. […] Natural love and the one-sided demand 
have a common understanding of life” (ED, 127).  
However, the underlying strict Lutheran anthropology and the socio-biological 
contingency ascribed to natural love distort the harmonious picture. In the end, Løgstrup insists 
that the ‘purity’ in the realisation of the love phenomena (e.g. trust), which life itself offers us, 
will always to some extent be degraded and ruined by the evil will of the human being, because 
natural love always in some way ‘receives its shape from the self’ (ED, 131). Secondly, for 
socio-biological reasons, natural love never lasts in a total and unconditionally pure way in the 
relationships that it creates, because of the ultimate contingency of all human affairs. Natural 
love is and remains ‘biologically, psychologically, and sociologically conditioned’ (ED, 134). 
This results in an ambiguous relationship between natural love and the natural basis, in the 
sense that the natural basis conditions natural love and at the same time destroys it (ED, 134). 
Løgstrup’s own example is the common case where parents try to live their own dreams 
through their children, and thus, to some extent, only love the child on the condition that it 
pursues the parent’s dream. Although not all parents fit this picture, Løgstrup’s point is that it 
is impossible always to be entirely loving and unselfish and that in any intimate relationship 
conflicts will arise – natural love in any pure sense inevitably fails as circumstances change 
through time: conflicts arise between the consideration for the other and for oneself, and at 
some point the demand will inevitably arise (ED, 135). Thus, one could say that natural love 
is conditioned in a double sense; the metaphysically determined evil will always disfigures 
23 
 
natural love, which is furthermore always already conditioned by the (contingent) biological 
human nature. The demand is unfulfillable, because it only is heard when it has been violated, 
and, as mentioned above, any attempt of the will to fulfil it is not an instance of the immediate 
and spontaneous pure love with which, according to Løgstrup, the demand is to be fulfilled.  
However, Løgstrup’s very strict application of Luther’s negative anthropology causes 
some serious problems for the possibility of an actual realisation of trust and natural love in 
human life on the one hand, and the destructive power ascribed to the human will on the other, 
and these eventually lead to a modification of his thought (Niekerk 2017, 189). Because of the 
strictness of his anthropology, Løgstrup finds himself forced to hypostasise love and trust and 
work with them as speculative entities:  
 
But the only love we know anything about from our own actual existence is a natural love to 
which we have given our own self’s selfish form; any other kind of love is pure speculation. In 
other words – to put it in philosophical terms – to speak about natural love in the manner of this 
discussion is to hypostasise it  (ED, 138).  
 
If good (natural love) and evil are real, Løgstrup suggests, they cannot consist in human 
approximations which tend to relativize everything into quantitative categories of ‘more or 
less’. In order to retain the categories of good and evil as qualitatively different Løgstrup has 
to hypostasise the idea of the ‘pure good’ in order to reduce neither the goodness of life nor the 
evil nature of the human will to something relative. But is this really true, when one takes 
Løgstrup’s own phenomenological approach into account? Is it possible to derive an idea of 
‘pure’ love as the basic human experience of the goodness of life, if this phenomenon is always 
already distorted? Løgstrup himself writes that goodness is the basis of life itself despite the 
evil will of the human being (ED, 140). This critique was also made by the Danish theologian 
Ole Jensen, who drew attention to the fact that it is a contradiction to claim the existence of 
pure goodness as an inherent structure of life and then also claim that this goodness is 
speculative (OK, 117). In the later work Opgør med Kierkegaard (Controverting Kierkegaard) 
from 1968, Løgstrup answers this critique by adding an important new feature to his moral 
philosophy. He does not modify the absolute contradiction between the goodness of life and 
the evil ascribed to the human being, but instead admits that the goodness of life must in the 
end be sovereign over the evil will of man. As we shall shortly see, this results in the 
introduction of the idea of ‘Sovereign Expressions of Life’.  
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Firstly, however, I will return to the critique posed by MacIntyre. With the above 
analysis in mind, there are now various ways of responding to MacIntyre’s dismissal of the 
claim that the demand be unfulfillable. As Wayne Martin has suggested, MacIntyre seems to 
mistake the silent demand for a command. This conflicts with the silent nature of the demand, 
which does not command any specific action, but it simply demands one to care for the 
neighbour in the best possible way one can imagine (Martin 2017, 326). One could add that 
whereas commands belong to the category of social norms and thus are conditioned by the 
human context, the ethical demand is a pre-reflective phenomenon, woven into the structure of 
life itself and independent of human reasoning. This critique is connected to the fact that 
MacIntyre does not seem to take the full scope of Løgstrup’s metaphysical and ontological 
presuppositions properly into account when he, e.g., ignores the very different ontological 
status of ‘trust’ in Løgstrup to the status as a ‘virtue’ which it might be ascribed within a 
Thomistic context, with which he compares Løgstrup’s position (Stokes 2017, 282; Stern 2017, 
317-18). In Løgstrup, trust can never be a human virtue, because of its ontological structure. 
Keeping the Heideggerian ‘ontological difference’ in mind is thus of utmost importance in the 
reading of Løgstrup’s ethics, although Løgstrup’s difference is of course between 
unconditional goodness and conditioned ‘good’ actions, whereas Heidegger differs between 
unconditional structures of ‘Being’ and conditioned ‘beings’. In spite of this, I take the parallel 
to be illuminating, as it prevents the mistake of analysing the demand on ontic terms, like 
MacIntyre trying to understand the demand on human (logical) conditions and thus overlooking 
the unconditional nature of the demand: it applies to all situations at all times as a structure of 
life itself. 
 
1.2 Sovereign Expressions of Life  
We have now seen how, in ED, Løgstrup finds himself forced to create a speculative hypostasis 
of unconditional ‘natural love’, because human beings cannot possess such love. From the fact 
that the human will is always more or less selfish, Løgstrup concluded that pure unconditional 
love can only be thought of in an abstract sense, which inevitably makes the concept of natural 
love rather ambiguous. In Opgør med Kierkegaard, Løgstrup however makes a decisive change 
in his previously very strict Lutheran idea of the pervasive power of sin, which made it 
impossible for him to avoid an abstraction of the absolute good (Niekerk 2017, 189). The 
background of the change is founded in a controversy with Kierkegaard, but in this context I 
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shall mainly focus on the development of the life-expressions in relation to The Ethical 
Demand and only briefly touch upon the Kierkegaardian context. 
 The abstraction of the absolute from finite life is something Løgstrup ascribes to 
Kierkegaard’s understanding of Christianity (along with Kierkegaard’s subsequent followers 
in a specific Danish theological movement called Tidehverv), and following the arguments 
developed in ED, Løgstrup thus introduces his new alternative by means of controverting some 
of (what he sees as) Kierkegaard’s central ideas. Before moving on to these central ideas, it is 
necessary to clarify the specific Danish context for Løgstrup’s controversy with Kierkegaard, 
because of the very radical character of Løgstrup’s reading of Kierkegaard, which has been 
criticised by several Kierkegaard scholars. For instance, George Pattison has criticised 
Løgstrup for going too far when he asserts that Kierkegaard pleads for a neglect of finitude, 
that he focuses solely on the exclusive personal relation to the absolutely transcendent God, 
and that he thus neglects the importance of caring love for the neighbour (Pattison 2017, 95). 
Pattison suggests that Kierkegaard is not as radical as Løgstrup asserts, which is, e.g., evident 
from his Works of Love (1847) and also already in the three upbuilding discourses from 1843 
(Pattison 2017, 95-97).14 In these works, Kierkegaard stresses the importance of finitude and 
the concrete relation to the neighbour, who should be loved through the relation to the absolute. 
However, as Rabjerg has argued, what is important in this context is the fact that Løgstrup’s 
critique of Kierkegaard is directed towards a specific reading of Kierkegaard within Tidehverv 
that emerged in 1926 when Løgstrup was still a student at the University of Copenhagen 
(Rabjerg 2018, 89). One of its leading figures, theologian K. Olesen Larsen, used a very austere 
reading of Kierkegaard as a weapon against some other Christian movements in Denmark at 
the time, which he regarded as soft and pious (Rabjerg 2018, 164). Olesen Larsen thus read 
Kierkegaard as a strict proponent of Luther’s idea of radical sin and condemned any form of 
Christianity that praises God’s gift of love within finitude – God is absolutely transcendent, 
life on earth is total sin, and anyone thinking otherwise is a hypocrite and an idolater (Rabjerg 
2018, 163). It is this austere conception of Kierkegaard that Løgstrup opposes, and in his 
preface to OK he hints very strongly at Tidehverv’s picture of Kierkegaard as the target for his 
critique. The reason why the book is not simply called ‘Controverting K. Olesen Larsen’ is, 
Rabjerg suggests, both the fact that Olesen Larsen (provocatively) saw himself as 
Kierkegaard’s direct spokesman and the fact that Olesen Larsen had died a few years in 
advance of Løgstrup’s publication (Rabjerg 2018, 165). Given this context, it is natural to 
                                                        
14 See also Pattison (2005, 115-26) and Ferreira (2001).   
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suppose that when Løgstrup criticises various Kierkegaardian ideas, it is very likely a critique 
directed at Tidehverv’s specific – and rather dark – reading of Kierkegaard to which he had 
himself been exposed throughout his youth and professional career at Aarhus University. I thus 
suggest that Pattison is right in drawing attention to other possible readings of Kierkegaard that 
are less radical and more sensitive to the complexity of Kierkegaard’s idea of neighbour-love.  
With this precaution in mind, I now turn to a couple of Kierkegaardian ideas, central to 
Løgstrup’s criticism. Løgstrup agrees with Kierkegaard regarding the idea of existence as 
ethically qualified and the reality of an infinite and unconditional ethical demand, but he 
disagrees regarding the content and accomplishment of the demand. For Kierkegaard, Løgstrup 
claims, there is an absolute distinction between time and eternity, between absolute goodness 
(God) and totally sinful finitude, and nothing finite can be an expression of the fulfilment of 
the absolute demand; only in the entirely private relation to God is it possible for the individual 
to receive unconditional redemption, and, according to Løgstrup, the demand is ultimately a 
demand to die away from the finite world instead of a demand of love of the concrete neighbour 
(OK, 132). This is perhaps the most central idea Løgstrup rejects and he subsequently 
introduces the alternative idea that the accomplishment of the infinite ethical demand happens 
in the finite world by virtue of ‘sovereign expressions of life’ such as mercy, openness of 
speech, love, and trust. According to Løgstrup, these are specific interpersonal ethical 
phenomena through which unconditional goodness is accomplished, i.e., the content of the 
demand is the concrete love of the neighbour, and the accomplishment of redeeming love 
happens through the life-expressions. In this way Løgstrup moves away from the idea that the 
absolute good is totally transcendent and the subsequent conclusion that finitude is total sin. 
As Kees van Kooten Niekerk has pointed out, Løgstrup’s point with the introduction of the 
life-expressions is the claim that living in finitude is not wrong (evil) in itself, but rather evil is 
living selfishly in it (Nierkerk 2017, 190). Moral failure is ascribed solely to the human will, 
not finitude as such. With the introduction of the idea of ‘sovereign expressions of life’ 
(sometimes merely called ‘life-expressions’ or ‘expressions of life’), Løgstrup claims to be 
able show how everyday empirical ethical phenomena express the actual realisation of 
unconditional goodness in life, i.e. not by virtue of the will, but by virtue of life itself.  
The following analysis of the sovereign expressions of life corresponds with the first 
two focal points in the comparison of Løgstrup and Murdoch presented in the introduction, i.e., 
the two-way-movement and the ethical demand inherent in their moral realism. Regarding the 
first, the two-way-movement, Løgstrup continuously moves from empirical to metaphysical 
analysis in his examination of the ontological structure of experienced interpersonal 
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phenomena like trust, mercy, love, and the openness of speech. This approach is also 
characteristic of Murdoch, although the empirical phenomena she analyses are those of human 
consciousness rather than any given interpersonal phenomena. As we shall see, the difference 
in choice of empirical phenomena through which Murdoch and Løgstrup each claim to be able 
to assert the ontologically structured reality of the absolute and unconditional Good is closely 
connected to their pre-existing metaphysical framing of existence as such. This existing 
framing is related to the second focal point, the structure of their respective moral realism, 
which is meant to illuminate the metaphysical foundation of existence as ethically qualified 
and thus implicating a ubiquitous and absolute ethical demand (or appeal). In Løgstrup, a 
decisive point of departure in this regard is the strong emphasis on life as a created and ongoing 
gift. This was already hinted at above, where Løgstrup explained the ontological structure of 
trust as an ‘ongoing renewal of life’ (ED, 14). It is hard to deny the fact that we have not given 
ourselves life, and we cannot deny the reality of time, but, as we shall later see in comparison 
to Murdoch, the ongoing-gift-metaphor is not the only possible interpretation. Nevertheless, 
Løgstrup agrees with the Christian tradition at this point, and it is partly through the 
interpretation of life as an ongoing gift that the ethical demand receives its content15. This idea 
is already evident in ED:   
 
First, it [the demand] receives its content from a fact, from a person to person relationship which 
can be demonstrated empirically, namely, that one person’s life is involved with the life of 
another person. The point of the demand is that one is to care for whatever in the other person’s 
life that involvement delivers into his or her hands. Second, the demand receives its one-
sidedness from the understanding that a person’s life is an ongoing gift, so that we will never 
be in a position to demand something in return for what we do. That life has been given to us 
is something that cannot be demonstrated empirically, it can only be accepted in faith – or else 
denied (ED, 123). 
 
The concept of sovereign expressions of life here provides the empirical parallel to the gift-
metaphor that permeates Løgstrup’s thought. They are, however, not parallel to the ethical 
demand, but prior to it, in the sense that they cannot be applied by the human will as a response 
                                                        
15 Although Løgstrup follows the Christian tradition at this point, this should not be interpreted as a traditional 
dogmatic religious standpoint. According to Løgstrup, Christian truth must correspond with adequate 
metaphysical interpretation of the structure of existence (KH, 98). I return to Løgstrup’s subtle distinction between 
the metaphysical interpretation of life as a created gift and the possible religious interpretation thereof in part II 
on religious aspects of ethics.  
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to the demand – applicability would go against their nature as created gifts. Furthermore, 
Løgstrup’s affirmative ontology, in contrast to his negative anthropology, is no longer 
speculative; the sovereign expressions of life are un-willed positive ethical phenomena 
accomplished by life itself:   
 
The Demand is unfulfillable, the sovereign expression of life is not accomplished by effort of 
the will to obey the demand.  The demand is however accomplished, but spontaneously without 
being demanded. The demand arises when the sovereign expression of life is absent – but does 
not breed it; the demand demands to be superfluous. The demand corresponds with sin [evil 
will], the sovereign expression of life with freedom [unconditional goodness] (OK, 117-18, my 
transl.). 
 
Løgstrup develops the concept of the life-expressions in contrast to phenomena he calls 
‘encircling’ and ‘obsessive’ feelings (OK, 95). Obsessive feelings like jealousy and envy are 
characterised by their tendency to imprison the self. They fixate one's thoughts on, e.g., the 
feeling of having been wronged, and they are thus uncreative, self-enclosing reactions through 
which a person battens on (self-assertive) resentment (OK, 97-98). In contrast to the obsessive 
and encircling feelings, the sovereign expressions of life are phenomena like trust, mercy, and 
the openness of speech, and they are characterized as creative forces in our interpersonal lives 
in the sense that they create and maintain the possibility of human flourishing in the first place 
(OK, 97-98). The creative force of the life-expressions is what enables us to be creative in our 
social lives, and it is through trust, mercy and the openness of speech that our actions can be 
other than mere reactions to our surroundings. In this specific regard, ‘creative’ connotes 
‘creation’ rather than ‘creative imagination’, and in this sense it is through the life-expressions 
that we are able to create space for human flourishing, the goodness of which is always already 
defined by the goodness inherent in their accomplishment. In Norm og Spontanitet (Norm and 
Spontaneity) from 1972, we find an illustrative analysis of the openness of speech as a 
sovereign expression of life: 
 
To speak is to speak openly. This is not something which the individual makes of speech, it 
[speech] is already open as an anonymous expression of life, so to speak. It is the sovereignty 
of speech to which we are subject in the moment we start speaking. Even in a situation where 
it is of desperate importance to mislead the other person, where the other person’s 
destructiveness is notorious and his games seen through to the bottom – even at this point it 
comes forward so that it simply feels unnatural not to speak openly (NS, 17, my transl.). 
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This is a model example of an analysis of the ontological structure of a sovereign expression 
of life. According to Løgstrup, these are given phenomena through which we intuitively grasp 
fundamental moral structures of human interdependency (our social lives) and also how we 
ought to accomplish our lives together. Niekerk has pointed out four central characteristics of 
the life-expressions, and in what follows I shall relate these to the fundamental gift-metaphor 
within which Løgstrup is working (Niekerk 2017, 191).  
First of all, the life-expressions are sovereign. They are an expression of the sovereignty 
of a creative force preceding the fallen human will. Goodness is, strictly speaking, something 
we receive, and it is thus not at our immediate disposal. The life-expressions are also sovereign 
in the sense that they show me what is good or right; I intuitively grasp the goodness of trust 
and the openness of speech. The sovereignty of Good is thus a transcendent force, and the 
fundamental gift-metaphor further adds an ‘outside-in’ direction regarding its actualisation. As 
we shall see, this direction of movement is fundamentally different from that proposed in 
Murdoch’s Platonic account of the sovereignty of Good, and the difference between their Greek 
and Christian fundamental imagery at this point is, I suggest, perhaps the most decisive 
difference underlying all their other complex discussions, agreements and disagreements with 
various modern philosophical positions.  
Secondly, the life-expressions are spontaneous, which is connected to creation as a 
continuous transcendent force, which spontaneously works through us and not by virtue of our 
will. Spontaneity has nothing to do with sudden impulsiveness but refers to the spontaneity of 
the creative force of sovereign, definitive goodness, as is the case in, e.g., the openness of 
speech. Spontaneity thus corresponds with the way the life-expressions naturally, immediately, 
and pre-reflexively, sustain our social lives.  
Thirdly, the life-expressions are definitive, in the sense that they contain an inherent 
definition of what goodness is and therefore have a moral claim on us. The goodness connected 
to the openness of speech is always already inherent in the structure of the phenomenon itself, 
and it is thus through the life-expressions that we learn what goodness is and how the ethical 
demand should be fulfilled. This definitiveness is given and not at our disposal: “…the 
sovereign expression of life has a claim on us, and this it can have because it is definitive; it is 
not us who first create it from undefined mental abilities” (OK, 99, my transl.). Furthermore, 
it is also definitive in the sense that as soon as it is the slightest bit disrupted, it is destroyed. 
‘Good’ is a definitive feature of the idea of mercy (which is not the same as claiming, on an 
different level, that mercy is always clever or rationally right): “Mercy is spontaneous because 
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the slightest disruption, the slightest calculation […] destroys it completely and makes it the 
opposite of what it is, namely ruthlessness” (NS, 19, my transl.). This assertion implies, I 
suggest, that one can only have retrospective knowledge about the reality of the life-
expressions; as soon as I reflect on the goodness of my action here and now I have already 
destroyed its goodness. One could of course then ask whether it is possible to have retrospective 
knowledge about one’s entire purity of heart in a past situation – a question Løgstrup however 
does not seem to ask himself.    
Fourthly, the life-expressions are unconditional. This is connected to the quotation 
above, in which we see how the slightest implementation of an ulterior purpose destroys the 
life-expression by making it conditional on something outside itself. The accomplishment of 
trust and mercy is, Løgstrup suggests, unconditionally and inherently good, because this is how 
we naturally understand the nature of these phenomena, i.e. their ontology. This assertion is 
thus based on metaphysical interpretation of the ontological structure of the life-expressions, 
and, as mentioned previously in connection to Heidegger, it is in this regard important to 
distinguish Løgstrup’s ontological analysis of the life-expressions from scientific 
psychological analysis (Bugge 2009, 52). The ontology of the life-expressions thus suggests 
that they are unconditional because they do not need any external justification. In this regard, 
Niekerk has suggested an inconsistency in Løgstrup’s assertion that the life-expressions are 
unconditional. Niekerk refers to the fact that the life-expressions are in fact justified with 
reference to their proper goals, i.e. their maintenance of flourishing in human coexistence and 
communal life (Niekerk 2017, 196; 212 note 13). However, there is a danger here, I suggest – 
without implying that this is what Niekerk aims at – of reducing the life-expressions to 
explainable functions of our social lives. The life-expressions are not good because they sustain 
human flourishing, they are good as such, and it is through them that we learn that goodness 
as such is the accomplishment of neighbour-love. It is important to keep in mind, I suggest, 
that they are unconditional because they are not, strictly speaking, conditioned on anything 
else. In an example concerning disruption of compassion, Løgstrup says: “The foreign intention 
inevitably replaces compassion with a different motive, in this case an interest in stabilizing 
the prevailing order of society. From this empirical observation follows the metaphysical 
insight that it belongs to the nature of compassion to be unconditional” (ST, 271). A response 
to Niekerk’s concern could be that the accomplishment is not a legitimate or proper end of the 
life-expression. Instead, I suggest, the accomplishment is an inherent part of the life expression, 
and as such it is not an end but the inherent finality of the life expression, and this finality 
denotes the reality and unconditionality of goodness as such.  
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We have now seen how the sovereign expressions of life constitute the affirmative 
ontological counterpart to the negative Lutheran anthropology. As we have seen, the nature of 
goodness in Løgstrup is realised through interpersonal phenomena prior to the human will, and 
it is thus natural for him to interpret them as gifts that we must continuously receive. The 
redemption from selfishness is, according to this view, given from outside. A natural 
consequence is that the accomplishment of the ethical demand is also happening through a 
surrender of the will (OK, 116). The nature of this surrender is crucial however. It is a surrender 
which anticipates any ‘willed’ surrender (OK, 116). The metaphor is used several times by 
Løgstrup, and just as the phenomenon trust cannot be considered a virtue in Løgstrup, one 
should be careful with considering the surrendering of the will as virtuous. In his analysis of 
Løgstrup’s ethics, Wayne Martin suggests two possible coherent responses one could adopt 
when facing the ethical demand, one of them being a kind of Lutheran repentance, where one 
apologises not just for what one has done but also the imperfect fallen creature one is, which 
then leaves room for the gift of grace (Martin 2017, 345). Martin does not of course suggest 
that this is a way of fulfilling the demand. However, this kind of suggestion ultimately seems 
to me to miss the mark of Løgstrup’s endeavour, or at least to argue in the direction of some 
compatibility with more action-guiding moral philosophies. However, as Christoffersen has 
pointed out, what Løgstrup aims at is metaphysical description of our moral situation, and it 
thus seems inappropriate, I suggest, to go in the direction of trying to extract some possible 
practical advice for appropriate action from his moral philosophy (Christoffersen 2017, 180). 
The fulfilment happens behind our will through the sovereign expressions of life, and 
suggesting apologetic repentance as a coherent response is, strictly speaking, merely a variation 
of self-indulgence that furthermore removes the focus from Løgstrup’s main point: redemption 
(to speak with Luther) is already fulfilled in the immediate communication with the other 
person, and reflection on appropriate actions in specific situations is, again strictly speaking, 
always already being beyond the sovereign goodness Løgstrup tries to describe. I am aware 
that this argues in favour of reading Løgstrup more as a member of the metaphysically-oriented 
continental philosophical tradition rather than the Anglophone action-related tradition. This 
being said, it seems to me that the nature of the ontological interpretation of the sovereign 
expressions of life actually does suggest the placement of Løgstrup, despite his engagement 
with various analytic philosophers16, as a philosopher and theologian occupied with 
                                                        
16 See, e.g., his discussions of R.M. Hare and B. Russell (NS, 29-45; 64-68).  
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metaphysical description of morality rather than one concerned with working out what we 
should do. 
As we shall see in the following, the surrender of the will is also a main theme in 
Murdoch, but because of the practical nature of her virtue-ethics and her different 
anthropology, this leaves room for active, willed, responses to the demand from the absolute 
Good.  
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Iris Murdoch 
2.0 Love in Murdoch and Løgstrup  
In order to depict Murdoch’s contrastive position as concisely as possible, it will initially be 
necessary to point out a decisive difference in the understanding of the concept of love in the 
two thinkers, because of its important connection to their respective depictions of an absolute 
moral ground and the empirical moral phenomena in which they base their moral realism. 
Whereas Murdoch’s concept of love connotes the Platonic eros-love, Løgstrup’s conception 
works within the framework of Christian agape-love.17 At a first glance, one might easily 
conclude from the ethical universalism common to both thinkers that they are both working 
within the same metaphysical framework; they both seek to describe the moral situation of the 
human being within a framework of an ethically qualified metaphysical unity, and they both 
work with this absolute and unifying moral ground as something external to which the 
individual is naturally related (Schweiker 1996, 210). Nevertheless, as Schweiker has pointed 
out, although Christianity took over Plato’s ethical universalism, the Christian concept of love 
is different in a very important way, which is ultimately related to their different cosmologies 
(Schweiker 1996, 210).  As we saw in the above discussion, Løgstrup is anxious to show how 
absolute love can manifest itself in life by virtue of the life-expressions and thus to controvert, 
e.g., the Kierkegaardian idea of the absolute as totally transcendent. But goodness or love as 
such still remains something which the human being must receive from life itself, and it cannot 
be willed by the individual. Goodness is the ‘outside-in’ gift of grace inherent in the structure 
of life itself as an ongoing gift. Løgstrup’s understanding of love thus works within the 
framework of Christian agape-love, which ultimately makes the concept of virtue irrelevant to 
him. Pure love or goodness can, according to Løgstrup, ultimately only be received in grace.  
In contrast to Løgstrup, Murdoch’s conception of love is based on the Platonic idea of 
eros-love, which denotes the active human striving for spiritual purification in the light of the 
Good. The concept of virtue is thus, in contrast to Løgstrup, of utmost importance to Murdoch, 
                                                        
17 I work here with the classical distinction between eros and agape. For a thorough investigation of the difference 
between the concept of agape-love and eros-love see, e.g., Nygren (1982 [1936-38]) and critical responses in 
Wingren (1954) and Tillich (1954). The interpretation of eros and agape and the relation between them has been 
disputed, but in this context I work with the distinction in its roughly outlined classical sense, i.e. Platonic eros-
love as human love of the Good and Christian agape-love as the gift of grace from God. I use the classical 
distinction as an overall approach to interpretation and only in order to point out the important difference in the 
direction of movement of love and its connection to the idea of an absolute moral ground in Løgstrup and 
Murdoch.  
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and she consistently equates morality as such with virtue in her writings.18 Perfect goodness 
remains ultimately unattainable, but the continuous striving for it (eros) is nevertheless the task 
for the individual. Murdoch therefore emphasises the important difference between Love and 
the Good, which do not coincide in the same sense as they did in Løgstrup: “The concepts 
[Love and Good], even when the idea of love is purified, still play different roles. […] Good is 
the magnetic centre towards which love [eros] naturally moves” (SoG, 100). The Good is what 
we should love, i.e. we are actively directed towards the Form of the Good, whereas the good 
is only ‘active’ as a magnetic force towards which we are drawn. In that sense, there are no 
gifts of grace in Murdoch’s conception of morality, and redemption is not selfless reception of 
immediacy, but selfless love of the real.   
In MGM, Murdoch gives a concise description of her conception of the Platonic Forms, 
which also make up the background picture for the following analysis of human consciousness 
and its relation to the Good:  
 
Plato’s Forms, as objects of moral desire, and principles of understanding, are to be thought of 
as active creative sources of energy in the world, but are mythically pictured as separate and 
transcendent; they cannot be relativized by being absorbed into (historical or psychoanalytical) 
transformations of existence. At a superficial level history fashions morals, at a deep level 
morals resist history. […] The double structure of the Forms, being both immanent and 
transcendent, makes difficulties […] for them in their logical role (as everyday universals), but 
in their moral role presents a comprehensible image, and indeed, as a concept of the divine, a 
familiar one. What is ideal is active in the imperfect life, and yet is also, and necessarily, 
separate from it. This separateness is connected with the possibility of freedom and spiritual 
movement and change in the life of the individual (MGM, 224). 
 
Because this investigation concerns human morality, it is mainly the moral function of the 
forms I shall focus on in this context. It is important to notice how Murdoch ascribes a double 
structure to the Forms as being both immanent and transcendent, together with the fact that 
they are also active in imperfect life. Immediately, the picture resembles the one Løgstrup drew 
of the sovereign expressions of life. Trust, mercy and openness of speech also represented the 
perfect goodness as immanently active forces, realizing themselves in the immediate 
                                                        
18 This is perhaps most clearly formulated in her writings on – and re-writings of – Plato’s philosophy, which can 
be found, for example, in the essay collection The Sovereignty of Good (1970) containing the essays ‘The Idea of 
Perfection’ (1962), ‘On ‘God’ and ‘Good’’ (1969), and ‘The Sovereignty of Good’ (1967). The essay ‘The 
Sublime and the Beautiful revisited’ (1959) also contains important reflections on Platonic virtue and its relation 
to artistic practice.  
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relationship between human beings. The nature of the immanent representations of the Forms, 
however, is different from that of the life-expressions, because the Forms represent virtues, 
such as justice, patience, compassion, truthfulness, realism and courage (SoG, 87). Whereas 
Løgstrup referred to trust, mercy and the openness of speech as our immediate intuitions of 
moral goodness, Murdoch turns to virtues as the place where moral goodness resides: “We 
ordinarily conceive of and apprehend goodness in terms of virtues which belong to a 
continuous fabric of being” (IP, 29). As we shall see, the ontological structure Murdoch derives 
from the phenomenology of these moral concepts is not that they represent ongoing gifts of 
life, despite the fact that their inherent goodness is just as ‘given’ as Løgstrup’s life-
expressions.19 Instead they are representations of endlessly perfectible virtues, which thus 
function as intuitive guidelines and pointers towards perfect morality (the ideal limit), i.e. the 
form of the Good (IP, 28). Because of the Platonic conception of the connection between ethics 
and metaphysics, she sees virtue as the endless task of carefully improving our vision and 
knowledge of the real, which can then subsequently guide our choices and actions. Murdoch’s 
emphasis on virtue also corresponds to her focus on the importance of spiritual exercise as an 
unavoidable aspect of moral philosophy, which contrasts with Løgstrup’s focus on 
metaphysical description alone (Tracy 1996, 69-75; Antonaccio 2012, 126-127).  
 
2.1 Consciousness as the Basis for Moral Enquiry 
In contrast to Løgstrup, Murdoch insists that human consciousness constitutes the basis for 
moral enquiry. As Antonaccio and Taylor have pointed out, this assertion is connected to her 
retrieval of the Platonic insight that what we do is conditioned by what we can see, i.e., our 
actions are guided by the direction of our love and attention (Antonaccio 2012, 28; Taylor 
1989, 84). Murdoch is thus critical of her contemporary analytical philosophical colleagues 
within the field of ethics, who seem to focus strictly on rational reflection on universal rules 
for action. Instead, she suggests consciousness as the natural starting point for moral enquiry: 
“I want there to be a discussable problem of consciousness, because I want to talk about 
consciousness or self-being as the fundamental mode or form of moral being […] as 
distinguished from conceptions depending solely upon choice, will and action” (MGM, 171). 
As we shall see, her rejection of exclusively rule-based moral philosophies is thus different 
                                                        
19 David Tracy has argued that the Platonic conception of the Good also contains a gift-metaphor, which has 
gained much less attention than the idea of the Good as a magnet for human love (Tracy 1996, 75; see also Marion 
1991). In this context, however, I focus on Murdoch’s reading of the Good as the distinct and detached object for 
human love (eros) (SoG, 100). 
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from Løgstrup’s in the sense that she does not regard them as substitutes for morality. 
According to Murdoch, the problem is rather their restriction of the field of ethics – moral 
theory can involve rational deliberation on rules for action, but such deliberation must be based 
on the insight that rationality cannot be the foundation of morality. As Taylor has shown 
thoroughly in Sources of the Self – with explicit reference to Murdoch – human morality cannot 
be based on logic, science or rationality, but instead on the fundamental insight that to be a 
human being is to be naturally directed towards an idea of some ‘higher good’ (Taylor 1989, 
3).  
 In what follows, I shall shed light on how Murdoch gives reasons for this assertion by 
analysing consciousness on two different levels which, according to Murdoch, both support the 
idea that the inner quality of consciousness must be the starting point for moral philosophy and 
how this quality is related to the metaphysical (Platonic) idea of the Good (Antonaccio 2012, 
64-65). In my analysis I follow the strategy presented in the introduction, and I shall thus draw 
attention throughout to the two-way-movement between metaphysics and empiricism on the 
one hand, and on the other, relate this to the nature of Murdoch’s moral realism and its 
connection to an inherent moral demand to the individual. 
The first aspect is the particularizing aspect of consciousness. Murdoch is anxious to 
show how the constant discriminations of perceptions in consciousness are morally qualified. 
We constantly make discriminations within the muddle of our perceptions and order them 
through normative concepts such as good, bad, true, false, better, and worse, and on a 
fundamental level our understanding of such concepts is a result of the depth and complexity 
of individually experienced contexts (IP, 37). In this sense, our discriminations are always 
already conditioned by what we can actually see, and Murdoch thus argues that there is a 
natural truth-seeking aspect of consciousness, which evaluates its perceptions with regard to 
what is real (IP, 36). ‘Reality’ is however not a neutral word and covers more than the scientific 
use of the term, to which we have grown so accustomed in the modern world. In Murdoch, 
reality is a normative concept in a Platonic sense, and the truth-seeking aspect inherent in the 
particularizing aspect of consciousness thus corresponds with the idea that the natural human 
striving for knowledge of reality is a moral pilgrimage from appearance to reality, which is 
guided by the metaphysical idea of perfect vision (Antonaccio 2012, 65).  
The second aspect of consciousness regards its natural tendency to picture the 
surrounding world as consisting in ordered, meaningful unities. We naturally piece together 
the fragments we encounter on our way into enclosed unities, e.g., narratives about persons, 
political systems, the order of nature. In accordance with the first aspect, this unifying aspect 
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is also fundamentally morally qualified, and it corresponds with the unifying quality of the 
Form of the Good. Our search for unity is, Murdoch suggests, always already a search for 
moral unity, because morality is the only real and lasting unity (form) in our otherwise chancy 
and contingent existence (Antonaccio 2012, 65).  
 
2.2 The Particularizing Aspect of Consciousness  
I begin by giving an account of the particularizing aspect of consciousness. In this part I aim 
to analyse Murdoch’s claim that the continuous private discriminations and descriptions of 
reality within consciousness are a fundamental aspect of human morality and how this 
particularizing function can be read within a broader Platonic conception of ‘true knowledge’ 
as guided by the idea of perfect virtue. As we shall see, the moral qualification of the basic 
workings of consciousness is what ultimately makes Murdoch reject (quasi)-scientific 
conceptions of the basic structure of consciousness – in this context exemplified by her 
rejection of Stuart Hampshire’s non-cognitivism and Husserl’s attempt at a scientific 
description of consciousness. The moral qualification of the ‘inner workings’ of consciousness 
means that it is the ongoing presence of viscous imaginations, words and feelings within our 
minds which have a certain normative quality and on a fundamental level constitutes the reality 
we can see, and thus also what we can do (IP, 36-37). Murdoch rejects any rational or scientific 
foundation of morality that, according to her, views reality as a ‘neutral world of facts’ and 
moral activity as based in a freely and rationally choosing will. She claims to find this kind of 
segregation of fact and value in various, otherwise very different, modern philosophers, such 
as Kant, Wittgenstein, Hume and Hampshire (MGM, 50-55; IP, 4). In these philosophies, 
morality is, Murdoch contends, ultimately restricted to the workings of the will through its 
relation to a value-neutral external reality (MGM, 50-55).  
I shall now give a short account of Murdoch’s critical depiction of this view of human 
morality in order to clarify her own rival picture. In the essay The Idea of Perfection, Murdoch 
puts forward perhaps her most famous example of the changing relationship between a mother-
in-law and her daughter-in-law, which illustrates her idea that any moral theory must take the 
inner workings of consciousness into account as a serious place to look for moral content (IP, 
16-17). The essay also serves to reject the idea that the concept ‘good’ is a function of the will, 
which regrettably, according to Murdoch, results in the view that morality is merely a reflection 
of external willed activities and thus that the task for moral philosophy should be constructing 
normative theories about rational ‘public rules’ for conduct (IP, 10; MGM, 166). Murdoch 
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takes Hampshire’s non-cognitivist position as a typical example of the British moral 
philosophy of the time (IP, 6). Her argument is extensive and complicated, and I shall thus only 
point out the most important aspects that make up the ideal moral agent in Hampshire, who, 
despite fundamental differences with the above-mentioned philosophers, shares the strong 
emphasis on rationality, will and action.20 First of all, reality is described as the external 
(public) existence of ‘objects’, which are knowable by any rational being, and the human being 
is thus a rationally capable object that moves among other objects in a ‘continuous flow of 
intention [will] into action [reality]’ (IP, 4). This means that activity is real only as external 
instances of moving (doing) something in the public world, and furthermore that thoughts are 
only ‘real’ if they are directly expressed through an external action. Thoughts in themselves 
cannot do anything, and thus they are not, strictly speaking, real. I am thus only morally 
responsible for what I do, and not for the quality of my thoughts, i.e. what I can see. Individual 
identity is thus restricted to the doings of the will (IP, 5). Secondly, the ideal moral agent is 
pictured as ‘the ideally rational man’, who aims for clear, impersonal and objective knowledge 
of the situation before the personal will freely chooses among as many possibilities as possible 
(IP, 39). This ideal agent would thus have full objective knowledge of all features of the 
situation, a clear conceptualization of all his possibilities for action, and of all his dispositions 
and intentions, before he chooses what is ‘right’ or ‘good’ to do (which seems to be, Hampshire 
acknowledges, impossible). Implied in this view is that the will and reason (rational 
knowledge) are separated in the moral agent. Knowledge is neutral description of the situation 
in ordinary and commonly accessible terms, and moral concepts refer only to the freely chosen 
actions of the will. Actions are then judged as ‘good’, ‘wrong’, ‘courageous’ etc. with reference 
to the objective (and thus rationally conceivable) outcome of the action. Thus, Murdoch 
concludes: “Our hero aims at being a ‘realist’ and regards sincerity as the fundamental and 
perhaps the only virtue” (IP, 8).  
 This picture, however, cannot make up an adequate theory of moral agency, according 
to Murdoch, and in what follows I shall show how Murdoch depicts moral goodness, not as a 
function of the will, but as a result of the quality and depth of our vision of reality, which is 
                                                        
20 This is thus not a thorough philosophical engagement with Hampshire’s philosophy or how Murdoch’s rejection 
of his position relates to the entire analytical philosophical tradition. In this context I merely aim to show 
Murdoch’s rejection of a segregation of fact and value to illuminate her claim that description is always already 
normative, and that morality is connected to our inner (linguistic, pictorial, emotional) ‘visualisations’ of reality. 
For a more thorough analysis of Murdoch’s engagement with contemporary British philosophy see, e.g., Bagnoli 
(2011).  
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constantly interpreted and reinterpreted (with more or less care and love) in our continuous 
value-laden attempts to understand and describe the reality in which we act.   
Murdoch’s counter-example to the sincere, neutral and rational moral agent concerns 
the mother-in-law M and her daughter-in-law D, and it goes as follows: M has mixed feelings 
about D, whom she regards as good-hearted, but also simple, brusque, tiresomely juvenile etc. 
M cannot help feeling that her son has married beneath him. However, and this is Murdoch’s 
point, M does not in any way show her dissatisfaction with D. M behaves beautifully to D and 
does not let anybody know about her true feelings. What Murdoch is anxious to show is the 
fact that what is ‘happening’ is happening entirely in M’s mind (D could as well have died). 
Time passes, and Murdoch now suggests two possible developments in M’s view on D. In the 
first scenario M settles in some kind of bitterness over D, keeping a fixed picture of her as a 
silly and simple girl. But this is not the M of Murdoch’s example: “…the M of the example is 
an intelligent and well-intentioned person, capable of self-criticism, capable of giving careful 
and just attention to an object which confronts her” (IP, 17). M critically reflects on her own 
judgment of D, and tries to attend to her without prejudice, snobbishness or jealousy. Now M’s 
view on D gradually changes, and M starts seeing D in a new light: not noisy but gay, not 
undignified but spontaneous, etc. By attending to D in a just and caring manner, stripped from 
egoistic prejudice, M comes closer to a true understanding of D. 
This picture is strikingly different from the purely rational agent. Following the two 
aspects mentioned in connection with Murdoch’s depiction of Hampshire’s moral agent, I shall 
now illuminate her claim that her own moral agent (M) can function as a better picture of the 
fundamental structure of human morality. Murdoch is anxious to show how the inner workings 
of consciousness is real moral activity. This point is also expressed in MGM:   
 
It is impossible to describe mind philosophically without including its moral mobility, the sense 
in which any situation is individualised by being pierced by moral considerations, by being 
given a particular moral colour or orientation. […] Consciousness au fond and ab initio must 
contain an element of truth-seeking, through which it is also evaluated (MGM, 241). 
 
Regarding Murdoch’s emphasis on the importance of the evaluative process in the particular 
consciousness, I follow the insights of philosopher Julia Driver, who has suggested a moderate 
reading of Murdoch’s strong emphasis on ‘inner qualities’ of consciousness. There has been a 
tendency to read Murdoch as a substantive moral particularist, i.e. as holding the view that 
moral judgements are entirely based on the careful scrutiny of particular, context-based 
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phenomena (Driver 2011, 296). Instead Driver draws attention to the important fact that 
although Murdoch wants to draw attention to the importance of particular human experience, 
she does not want to altogether reject the function of external aspects of morality – including 
both straight-forward rules for action, but also, and very importantly, metaphysical ideas such 
as the Good and Love (Driver 2011, 305). I suggest that for Murdoch, as well as for Løgstrup, 
it is rather a fundamental debate about what constitutes the basis for morality than it is an 
attempt to reject any reflection on public (rational) rules as relevant for moral philosophy (IP, 
25).  
The first point in the critique of Hampshire’s non-cognitivism corresponds with the first 
of  two points Murdoch wants to defend in IP: the importance of individual reality. Murdoch’s 
example of  M and D suggests that we need a different conception of reality and the individual’s 
place in it, if the example is to make any sense (which she believes it does). When M 
approaches D she does not do this with ‘neutral, scientific objectivity’, and the concepts with 
which she describes her cannot be exhaustively described according to rational and scientific 
prescripts (Bagnoli 2011, 204-5). The normative words with which she describes D are not 
derived from a ‘open’ and common-sense set of neutral and rational descriptions of what it 
means to be ‘juvenile’, ‘simple’, or ‘good-hearted’. As Bagnoli has suggested, Murdoch’s point 
is in contrast that moral concepts are much more deep, private, and complex in character, 
because they are always already tied to the history of individual contexts of inexhaustible 
complexity (Bagnoli 2011, 201). The understanding of, for example, the concept ‘repentance’ 
is tied to the history of the individual, and it might mean something very different at different 
times in our lives (IP, 25). Murdoch thus draws on a Hegelian insight that the content of abstract 
universals, e.g., courage, changes over time as they are applied by different people in different 
contexts. They are enriched and changed by their concrete embodiments (Bagnoli 2011, 222). 
In IP, Murdoch suggests that moral concepts should be treated as concrete universals, because 
the variety of their meaning is endless (IP 29). It is however important to notice that this does 
not speak in favour of an elimination of universal moral concepts. Instead, Murdoch points to 
the fact that all universals gain their concrete content from creatively interpreting individuals 
in specific historical contexts (Bagnoli 2011, 223). In this way, M’s descriptions of D are tied 
to M’s individual history and her individually interpreted conception of the world. Our 
continuous evaluations and re-evaluations are thus individualised and given a specific moral 
‘colour’. They receive this individualisation from our continuous individual attentive looking 
(or lack of the same) at the world, and attention is never neutral: “…attention ‘introduces’ value 
into the world which we confront. We have already partly willed our world when we come to 
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look at it; and we must admit moral responsibility for this ‘fabricated’ world, however difficult 
it may be to control the process of fabrication” (DPR, 201). The progressive nature of private 
individual outlook thus contrasts with the scientific idea of openness and rationality as 
constituents for ‘reality’:  
 
Moral language, which relates to a reality infinitely more complex than that of science, is often 
unavoidably idiosyncratic and inaccessible. Words are the most subtle symbols which we 
possess and our human fabric depends on them. […] We are men and we are moral agents 
before we are scientists, and the place for science in human life must be discussed in words (IP, 
33).   
 
A consequence of this view is that our moral responsibility is connected to the quality of our 
individual, continuously changing, ‘fabric of being’, through which we see the world. Morality 
is thus primarily connected to the quality of our vision instead of the momentary acts of the 
will. ‘We have already willed our world’ further suggests that the will is much more closely 
entangled with an individual outlook, and ‘choice’ is much less a sudden force of the ‘external’ 
will. As we see in the case of M, moral change is not a sudden reorientation of the will, but her 
slow and careful reorientation of the quality of the dense structure of her entire outlook – she 
struggles to see D clearly in a ‘just and loving’ light rather than from her snobbish and narrow-
minded point of departure (IP, 17; 23). In this regard it is important to emphasise the conception 
of clarity inherent in the example with M and D. In the example, there was an important 
qualification of clarity (objectivity) as the surrender of judgements biased by selfishness 
(jealousy, snobbishness). What made M’s position morally criticisable was thus not its 
(possible) rational inconsistency but its selfish nature. Moral failure in Murdoch is thus 
qualified as selfish distortion of external reality and the inability to see beyond the fabric of 
our own world (Bagnoli 2011, 218). What makes M’s struggle a difficult and a moral one is 
the complicated task of attending to – and understanding – a reality which lies beyond her own 
personally knitted conception of the world. In this way, truth and objectivity is reality freed 
from selfish distortions and cannot be associated with seeing clearly in a scientific sense (there 
is no such ‘objective’ truth) (IP, 29). In DPR, Murdoch pictures a situation such as M’s in this 
way: “We are obscure to ourselves because the world we see already contains our values and 
we may not be aware of the slow delicate processes of imagination and will which have put 
those values there” (DPR, 200). 
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Finally, this conception of morality is closely related to the second central point in IP: 
the idea of moral perfection. M’s attempt to see D justly and lovingly represents virtuousness 
as an endless striving for understanding individual reality outside oneself: “…the central 
concept of morality is ‘the individual’ thought of as knowable by love” (IP, 29). M’s attempt 
to see D justly and lovingly is an attempt to see reality without the distortions of selfish fear 
and ignorance. This is the way in which virtuousness in Murdoch is a continuous process of 
‘unselfing’ by directing imagination towards what is real and away from ‘false pictures’ that 
serve as consolations for the habitually thinking and often fearful self (Antonaccio 2012, 142).  
 
2.3 Platonic Anthropology 
The above analysis also indicates an important difference between Murdoch’s and Løgstrup’s 
anthropologies, which I shall briefly touch upon. In an article on Løgstrup, Hans Fink points 
out that Løgstrup and Murdoch world agree that the enemy in our moral lives is egoism (Fink 
2017, 68). Fink is perfectly right in this, but a clarification of what they mean by ‘egoism’ is 
needed, I contend. As we have seen earlier, Løgstrup pictures egoism as the evil will of the 
human being, and in this way goodness cannot be willed by the individual, but must take the 
will ‘aback’ in terms of the life-expression. 
Murdoch, on the other hand, is anxious to move away from the traditional focus on the 
will in moral philosophy, and instead she adopts the Platonic notion of vision. Thus, she sees 
the moral agent as a creative evaluator who constantly pictures his surrounding world, however 
often in a false and self-protective manner: “The psyche is a historically determined individual, 
relentlessly looking after itself. […] The area of its vaunted freedom of choice is not usually 
very great. One of its main pastimes is daydreaming. It is reluctant to face unpleasant realities” 
(SoG, 76-77). This characterization of the self as falsifying (daydreaming) and fearful 
corresponds to Murdoch’s analysis of evil as the result of a ‘depraved vision’ (MGM, 103). In 
this way, it is not the will that is evil, it is ignorance, which can, however, according to the 
above picture of M, be purified through virtuous attention. Evil is thus much more entangled 
with the direction of our attention than with our will, and goodness is not something which 
takes the will aback, but the active purification of desires: “The good (better) man is liberated 
from selfish fantasy, can see himself as others see him, imagine the needs of other people, love 
unselfishly, lucidly envisage and desire what is truly valuable. This is the ideal picture” (MGM, 
331).  
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2.4 The Unifying Aspect of Consciousness  
We have now seen Murdoch’s account of how our particularizing encounter with empirical 
reality is morally qualified, and we have seen how the ideal moral agent attends to reality freed 
from the ego and in a just and loving (compassionate) manner. But our encounter with the 
world is not merely a moment-to-moment undertaking of constant discrimination between true 
and false. According to Murdoch, there is a second aspect of consciousness, which is connected 
to our inescapable creative tendency to picture ourselves as whole persons who are parts of 
larger contexts with some degree of continuity and order (MGM, 1). Throughout history, 
philosophers have tried to describe the metaphysical precondition for our experience of the 
world as a continuous and unified whole, and Murdoch often refers to Kant’s idealism or 
Husserl’s phenomenology of consciousness as alternative, but nevertheless insufficient, 
attempts at finding such a precondition. However, as Schweiker and Antonaccio have 
suggested, Murdoch nevertheless draws on Kant’s idea that the human mind is a synthetic 
activity with a natural metaphysical ‘craving’, but then ultimately rejects his assumption that 
Reason makes up the unifying aspect of human existence (Schweiker 1996, 225; Antonaccio 
2012, 65). In contrast to Kant, Murdoch sees metaphysics as a fundamental artistic impulse – 
we use our imagination to join the world, and we experience goodness when we do this in 
accordance with truth, that is, accurately, justly, and lovingly (SoG, 88). As we shall see, 
Murdoch thus merges the Kantian idea of metaphysical moral unity with the Platonic idea of 
virtuousness as striving for perfect vision of the real. In this way, the idea of the Good functions 
as a transcendental unifier of human experience as such, and it is thus qua the Good as a 
transcendental aspect of human consciousness that human existence is unified as a morally 
qualified whole.  
In the following analysis I begin by giving a short account of an important metaphysical 
precondition in Murdoch and of how this is related to the two aspects of consciousness. This 
establishes an important background for the subsequent analysis of the Good as a 
transcendental aspect of consciousness.  The analysis of the unifying aspect of consciousness 
also corresponds with the first focal point presented in the introduction, namely the movement 
between empirical and metaphysical analysis. Where Løgstrup focused on the life-expressions, 
Murdoch instead focuses on practical examples of virtue, which she interprets as the empirical 
experience that points in the direction of a unifying, absolute moral ground. Finally, as was the 
case in Løgstrup, Murdoch’s choice of empirical point of departure is also closely connected 
to her metaphysical background picture, which is related to the second focal point presented in 
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the introduction: the nature of their respective moral realism and its implication of a ubiquitous 
moral demand – life, in terms of external reality, always already has a moral claim on us.  
The important metaphysical precondition for this context is Murdoch’s revival of the 
Greek perspective which asserts that existence is fundamentally pointless and has no external 
point or purpose (Gk. teloV). This is the foundation of Greek cosmology, to which the 
Christian idea of creatio ex nihilo is foreign, and there is thus no conception of the Good (God) 
as continuously sustaining existence. In the second part of the thesis I further elaborate what I 
contend to be the important significance the idea of creation has for Løgstrup’s and Murdoch’s 
conceptions of morality. For this context, however, it is sufficient to remain focused on 
Murdoch’s assumption that existence has no extrinsic purpose – it is as such pointless, and, 
more importantly, there is no idea of a creative force of renewal of life, as we saw in Løgstrup’s 
life-expressions. Whereas Løgstrup’s analysis of negative and affirmative ontology suggests 
that ultimately none of them can be rationally explained, and one must at this point choose a 
standpoint, it might seem as if Murdoch chooses the opposite standpoint and that her ontology 
therefore cannot, strictly speaking, be categorized as affirmative in Løgstrup’s use of the term. 
Murdoch puts it thus: “That human life has no external point or teloV is a view as difficult to 
argue as its opposite, and I shall simply assert it. […] We are what we seem to be, transient 
mortal creatures subject to necessity and chance” (SoG, 77). And later: “…the world is aimless, 
chancy, huge, and we are blinded by self” (SoG, 97).  Initially, this statement resembles the 
negative ontologies of existentialism and science that Løgstrup rejected. However, what 
qualifies Murdoch’s position as affirmative ontology, I suggest, is her insistence that although 
there might not be a metaphysical moral unity in the traditional Christian sense, there in fact is 
a different kind of moral unity in existence, despite its evident pointlessness:  
 
…there is, in my view, no God in the traditional sense of that term; and the traditional sense is 
perhaps the only sense. […] Equally the various metaphysical substitutes for God – Reason, 
Science, History – are false deities. […] And if there is any kind of sense or unity in human 
life, and the dream of this does not cease to haunt us, it is of some other kind and must be sought 
within a human experience which has nothing outside it (SoG, 77, my emphasis). 
 
Because of the aimlessness and contingency of the world, it is impossible to derive an idea of 
any ongoing gift of love; the universe is not concerned with us, and love and goodness are 
human accomplishments. It is possible, however, Murdoch contends, to derive an idea of a 
unifying conception of goodness towards which the human consciousness as a unified whole 
45 
 
is always already naturally directed, despite the simultaneous experience of the world’s chancy 
and contingent particularity. As we have already partly seen regarding the particularizing 
aspect of consciousness, this directedness is evident from our experience of the value of virtue, 
which points at the curious juxtaposition of pointlessness and value in the idea of the Good – 
virtue simply is good in itself without any point or purpose (SoG, 85). Murdoch is thus anxious 
to retain the tension, inherent in human existence, between unity and fragmentation, our sense 
of ourselves and our world as ‘whole’ and yet also, at times, inexplicably fragmented and 
chaotic (Antonaccio 1996, 128). This tension between unification and fragmentation in 
consciousness is also reflected in the virtuous agent. We have seen how Murdoch emphasises 
the fragmented and contingent status of reality by suggesting that the concepts we apply to it 
should be understood as concrete universals, picturing the inexhaustible complexity and 
contingency of individual reality. The virtuous agent is able to discriminate and attend carefully 
to the muddled and contingent individual reality of the other (recall the mother-in-law). 
However, there is yet another feature of the attention in the virtuous agent, namely, its form, 
i.e. the inevitable creation of a unified picture and a unified understanding of reality. M attends 
to D through a just and loving gaze, which means that she unifies her attention by trying to join 
the parts into a true picture of reality. The justice and love with which she attends to D 
emphasise the moral qualification of truth and, as shown above, how truth is connected to 
goodness. M’s unified picture, Murdoch suggests, is thus related to the idea that consciousness 
as a whole is fundamentally unified by the idea of the Good as perfect reality (truth), that is, on 
a fundamental level, we see things in the light of the sovereign Good up against which we 
always already evaluate the world we encounter (MGM, 427; Antonaccio 2012, 67). It is this 
assumption that I shall now explore.  
 
2.5 The transcendent Good as a Transcendental Aspect of Consciousness  
In this section, I explore how Murdoch asserts the reality of an absolute moral ground as the 
fundamental unifier of human experience by combining a ‘logical’ transcendental argument 
about the sovereignty of Good with an appeal to everyday human experience of the goodness 
of virtue. In contrast to Løgstrup’s metaphysics, this assertion is based on a unified 
metaphysical interpretation of our experience of the value of virtue. Virtues do not merely 
make up single instances of goodness; they point at morality as an ontological structure of 
human existence: “The idea of perfection haunts all our activity, and we are well aware of how 
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we try to blot it out. Here we see how it matters to talk or think about ‘the Good’ or ‘virtue’ as 
something unitary, rather than just instancing cases of admirable conduct” (MGM, 428).  
 However, Murdoch suggests, it is very important to consider carefully how one wants 
to investigate the idea of metaphysical unity, because metaphysical deliberation easily slips 
into inadequate speculation and inappropriate attempts at finding quasi-scientific or quasi-
literal ‘deep’ structures of existence (MGM, 236). This awareness is a crucial similarity 
between Løgstrup and Murdoch, who both insist that metaphysics is careful interpretation of 
certain aspects of human life that seem to point in a certain direction. Murdoch puts it in this 
way: “…what is ‘deep’ in philosophy is not something literal or quasi-factual or quasi-
scientific. A careful explicit use of metaphor, often instinctive, is in place. […] Formal 
philosophy can come only so far, and after that can only point (MGM, 236). This assumption 
further stresses Murdoch’s claim that any unifying aspect of existence must be sought within 
human experience which has ‘nothing outside it’ – metaphysics is a result of human experience 
and human pictures thereof (SoG, 77). It will however be clear from the following that this 
does not lead to a Cartesian or idealist standpoint in Murdoch, but, as Tracy has emphasised, it 
rather indicates a strong emphasis on the importance of avoiding any onto-theological 
connotations to the Platonic notion of the Good (Tracy 1996, 62).   
With this in mind, I now turn to Murdoch’s argument about the nature of the Good and 
its connection to human consciousness, which is perhaps most clearly formulated in her 
Platonic re-reading of St. Anselm’s classical ‘Ontological Proof of God’s Existence’ (MGM, 
391). In the re-reading, Murdoch rejects the theism ascribed to the Christian God, and by 
replacing God with Good, she retains what she claims to be the deep meaning of the Proof and 
what the old God symbolised: the unique and necessary status of moral value in human life 
(MGM, 396). This has of course been criticised by Christian theologians, who do not agree 
that Good symbolises everything the old God stood for. Schweiker has in this regard made an 
important point concerning the value of the individual, which I return to below (Schweiker 
1996, 209). Firstly, however, I give a short outline of the content of the original proof in order 
then to give an account of how it contains two different aspects – one empirical and one 
transcendental – and how Murdoch re-interprets these into a Platonic conception of the Good 
as the basic and unifying aspect of human consciousness.  
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The first part of the Proof is Anselm’s idea of God as “…the most real Being, than 
which nothing greater [or more perfect] can be conceived” (MGM, 393).21 Inherent in this 
formulation lies the second assumption that if such a Being can be conceived of in the 
understanding (consciousness), it must also exist in reality. This led to the well-known 
objection stated by the contemporary monk Gaunilo, and later by Kant, that existence is not a 
predicate one can add to a mental concept one happens to have (MGM, 394). In Anselm’s reply 
to this objection he makes two crucial points. The first is empirical and refers to our experience 
of morality as involving degrees of perfection; from our experience of what is less good we 
can have an understanding of what is perfectly good, which is the idea of God as the Being of 
which nothing greater can be conceived (MGM, 394). The second point has a transcendental 
character and responds more directly to Kant’s and Gaunilo’s objections that a thought concept 
(a thought essence) does not necessarily exist in reality. In this regard, Anselm makes an 
important distinction between the concept of God and all other concepts by asserting that God, 
unlike all other concepts, represents a non-contingent and non-particular Being whose non-
existence it would be impossible to conceive of (MGM, 394). The idea that God can be known 
through our moral experience of what is good and the idea that God is a necessary reality are 
thus, Murdoch suggests, the two basic elements in Anselm’s Proof. In her interpretation of the 
Proof, Murdoch now draws attention to the significance of these two points in Anselm’s reply 
and argues that the same can be said about Plato’s concept of Good. She furthermore 
emphasises the importance of the empirical support of the transcendental aspect, which 
prevents the Proof from being an entirely speculative and unrealistic assertion.  
Regarding the empirical point, Murdoch suggests that the idea of God is connected to 
an omnipresent idea of moral perfection, because we naturally compare lower degrees of 
goodness to an idea of perfection in our continuous encounter with the world – this regarding 
both the particularizing and unifying workings of consciousness. The ubiquity of morality is 
what we saw in the case of M and what we all continually experience when we meet a work of 
art, a person, a text, etc. We try to understand in order to gain a truthful picture of what we see, 
and we judge the text and the work of art from its ability to join a truthful picture of what it 
wants to show. The good artist is thus virtuous in the sense that she or he has seen something 
and is able to picture it truthfully (SoG, 84). Throughout her writings Murdoch uses the good 
artist as an example of the ideal virtuous agent, and she pictures human beings with reference 
                                                        
21 Although Murdoch’s translation differs slightly, I assume she refers to paragraph II in the Proslogium where it 
says “…we believe that you are a being than which nothing greater can be conceived” (Anselm 1926 [1077-78]).  
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to the fact that ‘we are all artists’ who creatively scrutinize and unify the reality we meet – 
more or less realistically (MGM, 334). The good artist exemplifies virtuousness because the 
beauty of good art resembles moral goodness in the sense that it exemplifies love of the real 
regarding both content and form. The good artist is able to scrutinize and attend to the 
inexhaustible reality of the irreducible individuality of the world, and at the same time look at 
it in a selfless, just and truthful way, that is, he sees it in the light of the Good: “The realism of 
a great artist is not a photographic realism, it is essentially both pity and justice” (SoG, 85). 
Elsewhere Murdoch suggests that this is why we primarily remember the complex nature of 
the characters and their worlds (and not the author) in Tolstoy’s great novels, because he 
succeeds in seeing them ‘as they are’ and portraying them with a just respect for their 
individuality (SBR, 276). What Murdoch is anxious to do is thus to incorporate both the 
particularizing and unifying aspects of consciousness in Anselm’s empirical claim about God’s 
ubiquity in human experience, which she then wants to transform into a unified idea of the 
Good. In the transformation of God to Good, Murdoch follows Plato’s parable of the Cave in 
the Republic in order to show how all human consciousness is always already engaged in this 
kind of (more or less successful) unifying artistic practice, because of its preconditioned 
orientation towards an idea of the perfect Good. As is the case of the escaping prisoner in cave, 
we naturally experience our lives, Murdoch suggests, as a truth-seeking journey, and we 
naturally connect goodness to the ability to see what is real:  
 
We ‘see’ God through the morally good things of the world, through our (moral) perception of 
what is beautiful and holy, through our ability to distinguish good and evil […H]e exists 
necessarily, we conceive of him by noticing degrees of goodness, which we see in ourselves 
and in all the world which is a shadow of God (MGM, 396).  
 
This is thus an empirical argument from our experience of morality, which suggests that the 
whole of consciousness is structured around the idea of the Good as perfect reality – either as 
a movement towards or away from Good (Antonaccio 2012, 112).  
As mentioned above, the empirical argument functions as a support for the 
transcendental argument. Regarding the transcendental aspect, Murdoch stresses the 
importance of the assertion that God is a necessary, non-contingent and non-particular Being. 
This means that God cannot be thought of as an object among other objects, but must 
nevertheless be understood as a necessary reality. In an article on Murdoch’s Platonism, Tracy 
draws attention to the fact that this conception of God makes it natural for Murdoch to read the 
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Proof in a Platonic and thus non-theistic sense as the Good ‘beyond being’ (MGM, 399; Tracy 
1996, 56). God can thus be transformed into a necessary conception of omnipresent and perfect 
goodness beyond being, which we conceive of through our encounter with external reality. In 
Plato, Murdoch argues, the Good is beyond any personal God and is instead mythically pictured 
as the sun in the parable of the sun in the Republic. The sun is what enables us to see in the 
first place, but we are blinded when we try to look directly at it. Furthermore, the Good is 
pictured as an omnipresent magnetic power that draws human love (eros) towards its centre 
(MGM, 399)22. This is a crucial difference to Løgstrup’s idea of goodness as a gift, and, I 
suggest, it stresses the importance of the above-mentioned distinction between goodness and 
love in the two thinkers and its connection to the movement of direction regarding the 
accomplishment of moral goodness. I return to this connection below in the analysis of the 
moral demand in Murdoch.  
For now I continue with Murdoch’s picture of the Good as connected to the unifying 
aspect of consciousness. The picture is, of course (Murdoch stresses), a mythical picture, which 
is supposed to show how the idea of the Good is the separate and absolutely transcendent 
precondition for our ability to see the world in the first place (MGM, 399). As Antonaccio has 
pointed out, this argument is thus an argument for the Good as a transcendental aspect located 
within human consciousness (Antonaccio 2012, 111). We always already see the world in the 
light of the Good, that is with constant reference to it, and this is what makes the concept of 
Good a necessary and unifying aspect of human existence. Reality is, ipso facto, moral reality: 
“Others who feel that perhaps the Proof proves something, but not any sort of God, might return 
to Plato and claim some uniquely necessary status for moral value as something (uniquely) 
impossible to be thought away from human experience […]” (MGM, 396). The Good thus 
makes up a necessary precondition of human life, Murdoch suggests, because we cannot think 
away our experience of an inherent moral orientation if we reflect upon or the structure of 
human experience. This picture corresponds with the idea cited above of the Forms as separate 
(transcendent) and at the same time immanent magnetic forces towards which we strive. We 
see the goodness of virtuous people and of good art in life, but we cannot see the background 
against which they are measured. We cannot, Murdoch contends, perceive perfection in our 
‘fallen’ world – we are always drawn further beyond by the magnetic Good that cannot be seen, 
for it is not there as a real ‘entity’ beyond – the Good remains an ‘edifying or hermeneutic ‘as 
                                                        
22 As Tracy remarks, Murdoch’s reading of the Good as a magnetic power ‘beyond being’ is not identical with 
other contemporary readings of Plato’s Good as beyond being, such as in Emmanuel Levinas or Jean-Luc Marion, 
who also perceive of Good as a gift (Tracy 1996, 57).   
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if’’ (MGM, 402). The Good is thus separate as a human idea, but not as an actual ‘place’ like 
the place of God in the traditional Christian sense of an ‘elsewhere’ (MGM, 399). This is the 
sense in which any idea of moral unity in existence must be found within a human experience, 
which nevertheless points beyond the limits of what is humanly possible. Plato’s metaphysical 
myths point in the direction of our experienced sense of moral unity, but as mythical ideas they 
do not disturb the coexisting reality of an aimless, contingent, and as such pointless world. ‘The 
Whole is false’ and ‘our world is irreducibly contingent’, Murdoch asserts (MGM, 370). Our 
sense of unity and contingency exist side by side, and the only real unifying force in existence 
is the light of the Good: “The only thing which is of real importance is the ability to see it all 
clearly and respond to it justly which is inseparable from virtue” (SoG, 85). Unity is not any 
material connection between objects; real unity is attention in the light of truth.  
 We have now seen how Murdoch works within the framework of a two-way movement 
between metaphysics and empiricism in a very different way to Løgstrup. Unity is a human 
accomplishment in Murdoch, which is nevertheless subordinate to the Good as the ideal for a 
truthful vision of reality. Our moral world is thus not unified through the givenness of love 
through life-expressions but through the Good as a moral ideal towards which we must strive.   
We shall now examine some implications of the empirical and metaphysical aspect of 
Murdoch’s Proof, which are connected to the accomplishment of moral goodness and her 
conception of a moral demand. Regarding the empirical aspect connected to our experience of 
moral goodness, it is now possible to add more content to the above-mentioned distinction 
between eros-love and agape-love, which has important implications for the direction of 
movement connected to the accomplishment of moral goodness. We see here how Murdoch’s 
Greek metaphysical interpretation of existence, together with the connection between goodness 
and knowledge (truth), makes her take an empirical point of departure that emphasises morality 
as a spiritual journey towards goodness instead of as a reception of goodness. In Murdoch, 
morality is thus based in human creativity, and any sense of unity must stay within this border. 
The above analysis of the Good can now help clarify the initial explanation of Murdoch’s 
conception of love as eros-love. We have seen how Murdoch draws attention to the fact that 
human beings are constantly creatively picturing their world and how this works both on the 
level of our particularizing scrutiny of the world and in our creative unification of reality. The 
creative force of love is thus placed within the human being in terms of an ongoing creative 
development of pictures and concepts that are more or less in compliance with a truthful vision 
of reality. The perfect Good however remains a separate and mysterious magnet, and virtue, in 
terms of selfless love of the real, remains imperfect. Moral imperfection is however connected 
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to the failed accomplishment of a movement towards an unreachable goal, whereas Løgstrup’s 
individual fails ‘backwards’ in his or her destruction of the goodness already given.  
 Regarding the metaphysical aspect, there is an important difference in the conception 
of the Good as an unconditional and necessary aspect of existence. In Løgstrup, the life-
expressions are seen as woven into existence as interpersonal phenomena, whereas in Murdoch 
the Good is woven into human consciousness as an idea of transcendence. This means that 
Murdoch’s human being is situated in an aimless world, in which it nevertheless has an 
experience of a unified directedness towards the Good and of seeing the world in its light 
(Antonaccio 2012, 64). An important feature of virtue in Murdoch is thus that it corresponds 
with the purposelessness of life itself – virtue is good for the sake of nothing (SoG, 84). The 
goodness of virtue thus consists in its formal correspondence with the separate and independent 
sovereign Good, which is as such a finality without end. This insight Murdoch derives from 
Simone Weil – partly drawing on Kant – who suggests that the sovereignty of Go(o)d lies in 
its independence of any means, which thus makes it a finality (MGM, 106).  Its finality is 
closely connected to its purposelessness in the sense that it does not serve any end, but 
represents the end itself: “The true saint believes in ‘God’ [Good] but not as a super-person 
who satisfies all our ordinary desires ‘in the end’. (There is no end, there is no reward)” (MGM, 
106). This is the sense in which virtue represents purposiveness without purpose – it points 
towards a separate finality beyond human ends, which thus unifies existence into a larger 
framework than the jumble of contingent reality. The idea of the moral absolute as finality 
without end resembles the point made previously about Løgstrup’s life-expressions, which 
similarly did not receive their goodness from their human ends but from their manifestation of 
the reality of an active absolute moral ground outside, or ‘before’, the evil will of the self. 
However, in Murdoch the Good remains detached, transcendent, alone, and magnetic in its 
‘absolute for-nothingness’ (SoG, 90). As Schweiker has remarked, it does not actively confer 
value on human life, but shows us how love of virtue is valuable as an end in itself (Schweiker 
1996). Murdoch’s conception of love as love of the Good might thus initially seem to suggest 
that what is morally required is personal salvation accomplished by love of the Good, rather 
than love of the other person. This objection is connected to Schweiker’s critique of Murdoch, 
in which he accuses her of merely establishing the reality of the Good (which must be loved), 
but failing to establish the goodness of reality and thereby the value of the other person, whom 
she nevertheless claims as the primary object of our love (Schweiker 1996, 227). This objection 
corresponds to the second aspect of my overall analysis, which concerns the idea, in both 
Murdoch and Løgstrup, of a moral demand of love of the other person as based in the absolute 
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moral ground. In the following section I engage with Schweiker’s critique in a discussion of 
Murdoch’s idea of an absolute ethical demand.  
 
2.6 The Demand of Love of Individuals 
In his article ‘The Sovereignty of God’s Goodness’, Schweiker criticises Murdoch’s idea of 
the Good as being insufficient to form the basis for a realist ethics. The main objection is 
Murdoch’s failure to establish the value of the individual, which is, I suggest, closely connected 
to the idea of the demand of love of the individual. The question is, why should we love 
individuals? Why are they valuable?  
 First of all, Schweiker shows how Murdoch’s conception of the Good avoids any 
internalist conceptions of morality, as e.g. in existentialism and (Kantian) idealism. External 
reality is the starting point in morals in contrast to e.g. internal ideas of authenticity or Reason 
(Schweiker 1996, 227). However, Schweiker still has two main objections to Murdoch’s moral 
realism. 
 In the first objection Schweiker argues that Good cannot symbolise the real if it does 
not contain an idea of the real as valuable. If we are to be able to establish a realist ethics 
claiming that the value of individual reality is sovereign to (selfish) human power, we need a 
sovereign moral concept that is directly connected to the value of individual reality. This we 
find, Schweiker contends, in the Christian conception of God as the creator of the actual worth 
of finite existence (Schweiker 1996, 226). In contrast to Good, the power of God actively binds 
itself to finite reality and confers value thereon, and this is necessary if the value of reality is 
to be superior to the powerful human ability to join and create its own world as we saw 
regarding the ‘one-making’ aspect of consciousness. In this sense, the Good symbolized the 
goodness of virtue, but not the goodness inherent in the reality attended to (Schweiker 1996, 
232). This is indeed a strong and effective critique that points out possible limits within 
Murdoch’s philosophy, and I shall therefore not assert that Schweiker has no reason to make 
this point. However, it is important, I suggest, to be aware of the fact that this critique is made 
from a Christian point of view. As we have seen in the above, however, Murdoch’s 
metaphysical point of departure is not Christian, and it is thus important to assess her 
conception of the value of the individual within the metaphysical framework with which she 
works. The Good does not love individuals, but it enables us to see others and to understand 
the limit and proper shape of our love. In this regard, Murdoch, first of all, simply asserts that 
individuals are valuable, and that we do not need any (consoling) conception of divine love in 
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order to understand this: “Human beings are valuable, not because they are created by God or 
because they are rational beings or good citizens, but because they are human beings” (MGM, 
365).  What Murdoch is anxious to stress is that we naturally discover this, if we really look 
properly and selflessly at reality. We discover that individual reality is valuable in terms of its 
private and irreducible aspects, that is, we discover that ultimately we cannot, and should not, 
dominate the world entirely with our own pictures and words (SoG, 96). With reference to 
Adorno’s philosophical attempt to ‘save the object’, i.e. the individual, from being swallowed 
by human power, Murdoch simply asserts the necessity of respect for the real: “The details of 
our world deserve our respectful and loving attention, as artists have always known. There is 
an attentive patient delay of judgement, a kind of humble agnosticism, which lets the object 
be” (MGM, 377). This reply will most likely not satisfy Schweiker, especially because 
Murdoch conceives of the value of the real in a quite different manner to traditional Christian 
ethics. I return to the broader scope of Murdoch’s alternative version of an affirmative ontology 
in the part on religion and ethics, but for now it is sufficient to stay with Murdoch’s point that 
reality must be respected simply because of its irreducible ‘thereness’, which checks the human 
tendency to want to master and make its own what is not. In much of her thought Murdoch thus 
seems to suggest, I contend, that we should love the other person out of respect for her 
individuality and irreducibility, and not because she is always already loved by a divine force 
of sovereign love. In this sense, the neighbour-love in Murdoch often connotes a kind of 
detached respect for what is not oneself rather than an idea of the actual loveable nature of the 
other: “Love is the perception of individuals. Love is the extremely difficult realisation that 
something other than oneself is real” (SaG, 51). As we shall see shortly, the idea of love in 
Murdoch is, however, not restricted to a detached perception of others.  
Firstly, however, I return to Schweiker’s second objection, which is connected to 
Murdoch’s notion of respect. In his second objection, Schweiker claims that Murdoch lacks a 
concept of conscience, which has a unique place in connection to the idea of the value of 
individual reality. If there is to be a superior and good power in human existence, this power 
must continuously be present as a demand of human obedience, and it cannot merely be there 
as a ‘magnet’ towards which we are naturally drawn in our search for truthful vision. To fully 
grasp the scope of human morality one must include conceptions of our experience that some 
finite reality simply ought to be and is holy and untouchable as such (e.g. a child, another 
person) (Schweiker 1996, 233). In the Christian tradition, Schweiker contends, the idea of 
conscience testifies that human power is always in service of finite existence by being subject 
to a created moral law and that “the shape of our existence [is] responsive to the non-
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instrumental value of others” (Schweiker 1996, 233). Murdoch’s analogue to this idea of 
conscience might initially be connected to her idea of loving attention. However, the idea of 
attention does not connote the idea of a ‘demand’ or the continuous presence of a divine moral 
law in the way Schweiker’s notion of conscience does. What Schweiker seems to miss in this 
regard is the fact that Murdoch actually does incorporate an idea of a ‘moral law’ and an 
absolute moral demand by merging her idea of morality as a Platonic pilgrimage with Kant’s 
idea of a ubiquitous moral imperative:  
 
We have to find our certainties [of the Good] for ourselves, in ourselves, and we must believe 
in our duty and ability to discover and make our own the truths which we first intuit or make 
out as shadows. […] Here we find ourselves close to Kant’s Categorical Imperative, the moral 
confidence which can only be consulted in each individual bosom […] This is the spiritual force 
and energy which moves us toward virtue, and it is as if it came from a divine source, and is 
the form in which, at our different levels of achievement, we can know the divine (MGM, 434-
435, my emphasis). 
 
Thus, in our confrontation with reality, we do not merely intuit the connection between 
goodness and truthful perception, but we also naturally have a sense of our duty to attend 
properly before judging and acting, however vague this sense may be. In this regard, Murdoch 
insists that the concept of duty should be seen as one aspect within the Platonic idea of goodness 
as purification of selfish desire. Duty should thus be seen as ‘innate in morality’ in the sense 
that we do not merely experience that we can improve our vision but that we also ought to do 
so, that is, the idea of the absolute Good suggests the idea of duty – our sense of truth suggests 
that the good person ought to be able to see clearly (MGM, 304). There is thus an important 
dialogue between Kant and Plato in Murdoch’s philosophy, and this also corresponds to the 
double structure of consciousness. As Antonaccio has remarked, the Platonic concept of 
attention is connected to the particularizing aspect of consciousness, whereas the Kantian 
concept of duty is connected to the whole of the human being. The idea of attention thus makes 
sure that our need for unity does not swallow or reduce the complexity of contingent reality 
(Antonaccio 2012, 66). With Kant, Murdoch however emphasises that the whole of the human 
being is under a continuous moral demand of respect for reality, and this aspect of Murdoch’s 
moral philosophy is as important as the idea of a moral quest towards seeing the real. What we 
ought to obey is the irreducible and private reality of the other.  
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Finally, it still remains to illuminate whether Murdoch’s conception of love is restricted 
to a kind of compassionate but detached respect for the reality of others. In Løgstrup, goodness 
as a variation of agape-love is given in interdependency, and the demand of love is thus 
naturally closely entangled with the other person, insofar as goodness is always already 
accomplished in immediate interpersonal community. The sovereignty of goodness is 
neighbour-love. In Løgstrup, I suggest, one can thus speak of the sovereignty of Love. In 
Murdoch, however, Good is superior to Love, but this does not mean that love does not make 
up our most purified idea of what goodness is. After a series of critical remarks about the 
obsessiveness and selfishness commonly connected to human love, Murdoch says: 
 
In spite of all the warnings mentioned above, love, love of lovers, family, of friends is an 
ultimate consolation and an ultimate saviour. To love and to be loved is what we all desire, and 
what we desire as, as we are able to see it, good (MGM, 346).  
 
What Murdoch is anxious to show is thus not, I suggest, that we should detach ourselves from 
others in a respectful attempt to ‘let them be’, but instead that Good remains superior to Love 
in the sense that we ought to purify our love through our relation to the Good – love ought to 
be real and not egoistic fantasy. It is in the redirection of desire towards the Good (virtue) that 
we are enabled to love unselfishly (MGM, 344). As was the case in Løgstrup, true love is the 
ultimate saviour, but in Murdoch it is, in contrast to Løgstrup’s conception, possible – and 
obligatory – to strive for ‘virtuous and truthful love’ (MGM, 344). This does not, however, 
exclude the possibility that selfless love can be simple and immediate, but, Murdoch insists, 
these cases are rare and “almost all human love fails in some way” (MGM, 345). 
Finally, we can now see the difference between Løgstrup’s and Murdoch’s notions of 
the demand of neighbour-love reflected in their different anthropologies. In Løgstrup, purified 
and thus real love had to be conceived of as a gift that ‘took the self aback’, because his negative 
conception of the will reduced any human effort to self-indulgence. In Murdoch, love is 
conceived of as a human ability, which is, however, blurred by ignorance and self-protective 
fantasy. The demand in Murdoch is thus to purify our love in respect for the reality of the other, 
and what we ought to surrender is thus not the will but the fantasies of our unifying and 
possessive ego.  
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PART II  
The Religious Aspect of Ethics 
Until now I have mainly discussed the first two analytical aspects presented in the introduction. 
We have thus seen how both Murdoch and Løgstrup move between metaphysics and 
empiricism in their attempt to reclaim the importance of metaphysical reflection in moral 
philosophy, and we have seen how both claim to find an inherent absolute moral demand within 
human existence.  
However, it has also been clear throughout that both thinkers work with metaphysical 
frameworks with certain religious connotations. Løgstrup frames his conception of human 
morality using a Christian vocabulary, and although he does not explicitly name the positive 
power of the life-expressions agape-love, it is an obvious classification, I suggest, when 
considering his strong emphasis on goodness as something given that cannot in any way be 
willed or created by the human being. In contrast, Murdoch’s metaphysical framing of a moral 
absolute in terms of the Good clearly connotes a kind of mystical non-personal deity towards 
which we ought to direct our spiritual energy, i.e. eros-love. 
 What I aim at investigating in this last part of the thesis is the third aspect of the overall 
analysis identified in the introduction, that is, the connection between religion and human 
morality. In what follows, I shall discuss how Løgstrup and Murdoch conceive of the concept 
of ‘religion’ and whether they consider it necessary to be religious in order to endorse their 
respective conceptions of human morality.  
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K. E. Løgstrup 
3.0 Creation and Annihilation  
In The Ethical Demand, we have seen how Løgstrup argues that the goodness of life is given 
in the pre-reflexive phenomenon of trust. Later we saw how Løgstrup developed a terminology 
for the moral phenomena given in existence, calling them sovereign expressions of life. In this 
regard Løgstrup insisted that the reality of these phenomena and the ethical demand that they 
instantiate can be demonstrated in purely human terms, that is, as a metaphysical description 
of basic traits of the human condition. However, it is also obvious that Løgstrup draws on a 
Christian way of thinking in his metaphysical interpretation of the life-expressions, which 
clearly echoes Lutheran anthropology and the idea of life as a gift, which has clear connotations 
of love as agape-love: we are always already ‘handed over’ to the neighbour by the sovereign 
power of trust (ED, 8). In what follows I turn to Løgstrup’s later work Skabelse og 
Tilintetgørelse (Creation and Annihilation) from 1978 where, among other things, Løgstrup 
makes a strict distinction between metaphysical description and religious interpretation. 
According to Løgstrup, the phenomenological analysis of life as a created gift can initially be 
unfolded as a metaphysical description that makes up the basis for a possible religious 
interpretation. If religion is to be anything other than an unworldly idea about a loving Father-
God, it must be backed up by a valid philosophical, i.e. phenomenological, analysis of 
phenomena that suggests that life is in fact a created gift (Christoffersen 2017, 181). It is thus 
possible to argue, according to Løgstrup, that the specifically Christian idea of revelation is 
based on a universally valid view of the world as created. In this regard, Niels Thomassen has 
emphasised the importance of keeping in mind that Løgstrup’s claim about the universal 
validity of his metaphysics is also based on phenomenological interpretation of the life-
expressions as instances of anonymous and unconditional goodness. It is on the basis of the 
anonymous goodness of the life-expressions that it is natural, according to Løgstrup, to add a 
religious interpretation to the phenomenological interpretation and read the life-expressions as 
created. Furthermore, he proposes that their createdness suggests ‘the interpretation that we are 
not irrelevant to the universe’ (ST, 273; Thomassen 2005, 118-19).   
As Christoffersen has pointed out, the distinction between metaphysical and religious 
interpretation thus divides Løgstrup’s conception of Christianity into two parts (Christoffersen 
2017, 183). The first part is the metaphysical basis, which is not restricted to Christianity as 
such. It is the philosophical investigation of the metaphysics of existence which describes 
universal traits about human existence. This is what we have seen in the previous parts about 
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trust and the sovereign expressions of life, where Løgstrup argued in favour of affirmative 
ontology in contrast to negative ontology as the basis of existence. Thus, at this level, Løgstrup 
analyses how we are woven into the fabric of life and how this means something to us 
(Christoffersen 2017, 181). The second part is specifically Christian, and it contains the claim 
that the creative power of life is also concerned with us. This is the Christian idea of revelation, 
that is, the idea of Christ as the personification of God’s sovereignty as creator and redeemer, 
who is concerned with our well-being and in whose kingdom we will all be saved from death 
(annihilation) (ST, 302-3; Christoffersen 2017, 183). I return to the specifically Christian hope 
for redemption further below. The seemingly Christian metaphysical framework that we have 
seen Løgstrup working with throughout is thus not, according to Løgstrup, specifically 
Christian, but represents a universally valid philosophical interpretation of the structure of 
human existence which makes up one part of Christianity. This is what leads Løgstrup to say 
that the battle between religiosity and irreligiosity must initially be fought at the level of 
metaphysics – religion understood, however, as Christianity.  
In what follows I will show how Løgstrup’s conception of Christianity is tied to his 
philosophy of creation and annihilation in order to discuss the credibility of his claim that a 
philosophy of creation can be accepted on ‘purely human terms’ and does not have to involve 
religiosity.  
In ED, Løgstrup admits that the connection between the analysis of trust and the idea 
that life is a gift cannot be substantiated phenomenologically, but must be accepted voluntarily 
as such or rejected (ED, 116). But although one accepts life as gift, it is also full of contingent 
suffering and death, and the idea of life as a created gift must take these aspects into account. 
This is what Løgstrup does in his analysis of existence as a suspension between creation and 
annihilation in ST. In ED we have already seen how Løgstrup conceives of the ethical life as a 
contradiction between the given goodness of life and the evil will’s destruction of the given by 
its inevitable selfishness. In ST, Løgstrup gives an account of the inherent tension in existence 
on a cosmological level, where the constant tension between creation and annihilation 
corresponds with the contradictory nature of our moral lives.  
In ST, Løgstrup initially asserts the reality of annihilation through an analysis of our 
experience of the irreversibility of time (ST, 37). Firstly, Løgstrup explains that irreversibility 
can mean two things. On the one hand, it can mean that time only has one direction – whether 
linear or circular. On the other hand, and this is how he uses the term, irreversibility is 
connected to the (Christian) idea that time never reoccurs – what has been is annihilated by the 
irreversibility of time. In this regard Løgstrup concludes: “Then it is impossible that time can 
59 
 
run circularly, it runs linearly, and irreversibility is based on and manifest in annihilation” (ST, 
37, my transl.). Løgstrup simply rejects the Greek conception of the circularity of time as 
foreign to us and insists that for us time is linear in the sense that ‘what is gone is gone’ and 
‘what has come to nothing has come to nothing’ (ST, 38, my transl.). Løgstrup thus interprets 
our experience of the contingency of life as annihilation and argues that time comes into being 
for us due to the irreversibility of annihilation. As we shall see later, the connection between 
annihilation and contingency is naturally challenged by the Greek point of departure in 
Murdoch. The second feature of our experience of time is our ability to remember past 
moments and recall them later in our memory – what Løgstrup calls ‘retention’ (ST, 38). 
Retention and memory are thus products of our consciousness. What we do when we recall 
memories is a creative attempt at preventing time from erasing our lives and experiences – we 
create our memories with pictures and language. What Løgstrup is anxious to stress however, 
is that time is not merely a product of the creative human consciousness, but originates in the 
universal force of annihilation, which is independent of the human being (ST, 39). He criticises 
Husserl and Heidegger for conceiving of time as a product of our own consciousness and 
suggests that our experience of time is instead a product of our revolt against the precondition 
of time in the first place, that is, a revolt against the external force of annihilation (ST, 39). 
This means that our experience of time is based in a force working independently of the human 
being, which makes annihilation something more than a human experience – it is a reality into 
which we are born.  
This leads to a decisive point connected to Løgstrup’s idea of creation as the contrast 
to annihilation. We experience time as a revolt against annihilation, but then the question is 
what is the power that makes this resistance possible. In this regard Løgstrup does not regard 
the creative power of consciousness as able to suspend annihilation. Memory is always 
backwards; it is always reproduction and not actual creation (ST, 39). The power to suspend 
annihilation must thus also be something external to the human being; it must be a creative 
power that sustains and maintains human life. Such power is what we saw in Løgstrup’s 
conception of the sovereign expressions of life. They represented pre-reflexive moral powers 
that empower us to resist annihilation, however not by our own will. As Christoffersen has 
remarked we are thus, in Løgstrup’s picture, thrown into the middle of a ‘battle between 
contradictory forces’ (Christoffersen 2017, 179). In this way, there is a creative power in the 
universe, but the creative acts that occur in the universe are not absolutely creative in 
themselves, because they are subject to contingency and thus annihilation (Christoffersen 2017, 
180). The human being can thus merely re-create; it has no power of genuine creation. Only 
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the ‘power of being’, exemplified through the life-expressions, has this ability. The life-
expressions are ‘pre-personal’ as sovereign positive powers of life and yet refracted through 
the contingent individual person as positive sustainment of human flourishing and a protection 
against annihilation (ST, 160). 
With this in mind, it is now possible to see the connection between Løgstrup’s 
metaphysics of creation and annihilation and ethics. By looking at the life-expressions as 
examples of the suspension of annihilation, we can see how the ‘power of being’ is ethically 
qualified, that is, it is not merely power but an anonymous power of sovereign goodness. 
Løgstrup’s philosophy of ongoing creation in terms of a suspension of annihilation is thus the 
basis for his affirmative ontology.  
As I mentioned above, Løgstrup claims that his philosophy of creation is purely 
metaphysical description that coheres with our experience of the irreversibility of time and of 
the unconditional goodness of the sovereign expressions of life. However, the philosophy of 
creation is then also used to support the religious ‘leap’ of belief in the revelation of God as 
creator and redeemer through Christ (ST, 302). The transition from metaphysics to religion is 
thus an interpretation of the metaphysical investigation, and this interpretation claims that we 
are not merely inexplicably thrown into a world of contradictory forces and furthermore 
empowered with the gifts of an anonymous power of goodness. Furthermore, the religious 
interpretation points out that the unconditional nature of the life-expressions indicates the 
possibility that the power of being is concerned with us, which makes it natural to interpret this 
power as ‘personal’, i.e. as God concerned with the human being (ST, 280). In this regard, 
Christoffersen has pointed out that for Løgstrup a theology of creation must be founded in a 
valid philosophy of creation, because the religious interpretation must be based in a worldview 
that can be accepted by anyone: “The analysis depends on its purely philosophical validity. It 
must be acceptable by anyone who does not agree with the religious total-interpretation” (ST, 
279, my transl.; Christoffersen 2017, 182). To believe in life as created, without religious belief 
in revelation, can as such represent a belief in affirmative ontology as a philosophical contrast 
to nihilism, whereas belief in revelation of God through Christ presupposes affirmative 
ontology. This is the sense in which the battle between religiosity and irreligiosity is located at 
the level of metaphysics. Nevertheless, I contend, along with both Christoffersen and probably 
also Murdoch, Løgstrup’s philosophy of existence as a created gift is already religiously biased. 
His analysis of the life-expressions as metaphysical indicators of a sovereign God is, I suggest, 
already based in the Christian insistence on time as suspended between creation and 
annihilation and the subsequent conclusion that the human being must constantly receive its 
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power from the sovereign power of being. Furthermore, his rejection of non-Christian 
cosmologies as adequate depictions of the human condition results in the (rather restricted) 
dichotomy between nihilism and philosophy of creation (ST, 279). As a response, we shall see 
in the following part on Murdoch that it is in fact possible to work with affirmative ontology 
on other terms.  
 
3.1 The Problem of Suffering and Death 
Before moving on to Murdoch, however, I shall briefly discuss Løgstrup’s conception of the 
problem of evil and death (contingency) and their relation to the sovereign power of goodness. 
In his metaphysics, Løgstrup described existence (and cosmos) as a struggle between the 
contradictory forces of creation and annihilation, and gave a phenomenological account of our 
experience of being suspended between creation and annihilation by the force of the life-
expressions. We have also seen in the previous parts how the evil will of the human being 
annihilates the given goodness of the life-expressions in mistrust and ruthlessness. However, 
the force of annihilation is ultimately external to the human being, and much suffering and 
death happens completely contingently. The tension between good and evil, suffering and 
flourishing, as an inherent part of existence, is acceptable at a metaphysically descriptive level, 
but Løgstrup complicates the matter on the religious level when he asserts that “God is the 
omnipresent power of being in all of existence” (ST, 302, my transl.). This means that the 
transition from metaphysics to religion does not result in a dissolution of the tension between 
creation and annihilation, but suggests that God, as the power of being, has created an 
ambiguous world, full of both joy and contingent suffering: “Religiously interpreted, the 
eternal and divine power of creation has incorporated annihilation and the associated suffering 
and contingency in his creation” (ST, 295, my transl.). Therefore, God cannot be seen as a 
superior moral idea as we saw in Murdoch’s transformation of God into the Good. It is not 
possible simply to say that God is the sovereign expressions of life. God is beyond the human 
understanding of good and evil, and, according to Løgstrup, we should refrain from judging 
God’s power on human moral terms (ST, 297). This does not erase the difference between good 
and evil, Løgstrup suggests, but stresses that God’s power is ultimately inexplicable and 
irreducible to human reason. The Christian person is thus not released from the inexplicable 
and ambiguous nature of existence. The only thing the Christian can resort to is the Christian 
hope, based on the belief in the teachings of Jesus Christ and his proclamation of a kingdom of 
God. The Christian must believe that God as the sovereign power of being at some point will 
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realize the divine kingdom of Jesus’ proclamation, where there will be no annihilation and only 
positive creation (ST, 302). There is thus an important difference between ‘the Creation’ and 
‘the Kingdom of God’: “[God’s] power is more than anything existing, it is eternal and 
indestructible, and it lets what exists come to an end. The power is pre-ethical, creation is 
connected to annihilation, splendour to cruelty. In contrast, goodness and eternity rules in 
Jesus’ divine kingdom, and there is no annihilation” (ST, 302, my transl.). That God’s power 
is pre-ethical, however, does not make it ethically indifferent – this is what we learn from the 
life-expressions – but belief in God does not remove the ambiguity of his creation either, and 
thus faith in the teachings of Jesus as the promise of God always remains fragile. The idea of 
a Christian hope must however also be substantiated phenomenologically, in order not to run 
the risk of being wordless and naïve. Hope is not a specifically Christian phenomenon, but a 
sovereign expression of life in the same sense as trust, mercy, love, and the openness of speech 
(ST, 319). Hope is a fundamental hope for life that peeps out even in the most hopeless 
situations. It is of course conditioned by annihilation and the contingency of the world, but as 
such it breaks the chains of annihilation because it receives its power from the sovereign power 
of being and reveals our dependence on a power that it not our own: “It is curious that a human 
being can be fully aware of mortality, but mortality cannot defeat hope, nor even weaken it 
[…] In relation to everything we have in our power, we are, on a deeper level, dependent on 
what is not in our power” (ST, 320, my transl.). On a very deep level, we all know that 
everything we are and accomplish is subject to annihilation, but in spite of this, we cannot help 
hoping for life and the suspension of death. This is because, Løgstrup suggests, hope is based 
in the power that can suspend annihilation and continuously does so by virtue of the life-
expressions, and this is what makes it natural to transform the natural hope of existence into 
the Christian hope of the kingdom of God (ST, 321).  
 It is now clear that Løgstrup’s ethics rests on a Christian worldview, based on the idea 
of creation, annihilation and the ‘power of being’ as the foundation of the morally qualified 
human existence, as well as the specifically Christian eschatological hope for the kingdom of 
God. It is however important to keep Løgstrup’s division of the Christian worldview into two 
parts in mind, which makes it possible for him to argue that the metaphysical description of 
our moral situation is universally valid, even if one does not believe in God as concerned with 
us. Løgstrup’s own division does however also indicate the close entanglement between his 
metaphysics and Christianity, which in the end cannot, I contend, be separated. A response to 
Løgstrup’s ethics is thus also always already a response to his understanding of Christianity.  
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Iris Murdoch  
4.0 The Ubiquity of Good 
As we have already seen in the above, Murdoch’s asserts that existence as such is pointless. 
She conceives of love as eros-love, and the sovereign Good remains detached, distant, and 
absolutely transcendent. Naturally, this influences her interpretation of religion and makes her 
connection of religion to ethics radically different from Løgstrup’s, despite the fact that they 
both conceive of goodness as selfless love of the neighbour. In MGM, Murdoch describes 
religion thus:  
 
Religion is a mode of belief in the unique sovereign place of goodness or virtue in human life. 
[…] It must go all the way, to the base, to the top, it must be everywhere, and is in this respect 
unlike other things (e.g. sex) of which something apparently similar might be said. It adheres 
essentially to the conception of being human, and cannot be detached; and we may express this 
by saying that it is not accidental, does not exist contingently, is above being (MGM, 426, my 
emphasis).  
 
This quote follows the previous analysis of the sovereign Good, but it also adds, I contend, an 
important feature, by stressing that goodness must be ‘everywhere’, that is, not merely within 
consciousness, but in the whole of existence. An important point I want to make in this section 
is that Murdoch does not merely conceive of goodness in terms of human vision and conduct 
(virtue), but further claims that goodness is rooted in reality as such. Until now we have seen 
how the Good was a transcendental aspect of consciousness, but in her retrieval of the religious 
mythology in Plato, Murdoch shows how the Good can be understood as the transcendental 
precondition of reality as such (Antonaccio 2012, 194). As George Steiner points out in his 
foreword to the collection of Murdoch’s essays, Existentialists and Mystics, the goodness of 
reality in Murdoch’s thought should be understood in terms of ‘immanent transcendence’ of 
the Good (Steiner 1998, 19). Drawing on this point, and insights from Antonaccio’s research, 
I will further elaborate my previous claim that it is possible to read Murdoch’s ontology as – 
using Løgstrup’s terminology – affirmative. The main reason this argument is connected to the 
idea of religion is, I suggest, the fact that Murdoch’s affirmative ontology is based on the idea 
that religion, in terms of a kind of ‘atheistic spirituality’, is an inherent aspect of the 
metaphysical idea of the Good. As shown above, religion in Murdoch is defined as the ‘belief’ 
in the metaphysical idea of ‘the necessity of good and virtue’ in human existence (MGM, 428).  
It is thus impossible, I contend, to make the same sharp distinction between metaphysics and 
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religion in Murdoch as in Løgstrup, where religion is understood on theistic terms and seen as 
a step beyond metaphysical description. We have noted Løgstrup’s point that the battle between 
religiosity and irreligiosity must be fought on a metaphysical level, where only affirmative 
ontology allows for religious interpretation. As we shall see, Murdoch’s metaphysics gives this 
assertion a very different meaning, though without rejecting its truth. This is so, I suggest, 
because Murdoch’s affirmative ontology is rooted in Platonic metaphysics, which is at the same 
time constituted as a mythical-religious picture of the origin of the cosmos and as a picture of 
the human condition as a moral-religious pilgrimage towards the Good ‘beyond being’.  
As a mythical-religious picture, Murdoch uses Plato’s myth about the Demiurge’s 
creation of the cosmos from the dialogue Timaeus. As we shall see, Murdoch’s reading of the 
myth clarifies her assertion of the ubiquity of value (the Good) in human existence and the 
sense in which religion is a (non-theistic) aspect of human morality. As Antonaccio has 
emphasised, the most important moral features of the Timaeus, according to Murdoch, are its 
two opposing types of causality, which can be seen through two different meanings of the 
concept ‘necessity’ (Antonaccio 2012, 192). I shall therefore give a brief account of Murdoch’s 
reading of the myth of creation in the Timaeus in order to clarify the significance of the two 
types of necessity and their importance for Murdoch’s account of human morality. In this 
regard, it is important to recall the point made earlier that Murdoch regards the Platonic myths 
as neither scientific fact nor divine revealed truth, but as metaphors for the moral condition of 
human beings.  
In the Timaeus, Plato presents the story about the Demiurge, a perfectly good and 
unselfish creator god who creates the world with the desire that it be as good and perfect as 
himself (Timaeus 29e). However, the Demiurge does not create ex nihilo, but turns to two 
sources that represents divine and contingent necessity respectively. The divine necessity is the 
eternal Forms, with the Form of the Good as the sovereign among them, and the Demiurge 
uses the Forms as the ideal model for his creation. For his creation the Demiurge also needs 
something from which he can create, and for this he turns to the chaotic body of already existing 
matter consisting of water, fire, earth, and air (Timaeus 53b). This ‘matter’ represents the 
second and negative type of necessity by containing qualities such as contingency, finitude, 
unpredictability, and irregularity, which resist the divine reason and absolute goodness of the 
Demiurge and thus make creation based on the eternal Forms difficult. This means that the 
creation of the world is carried out through divine reason persuading necessity to realize the 
greatest good possible (MGM, 107). In this way, the nature of the world is a tension between 
divine reason and necessary matter, and as such it is an imperfect copy of divine perfection 
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(Timaeus 48a). This tension is reflected in the human being as well. We are created in the 
Demiurge’s image, with a divine and rational soul that strives for the truth of the Good, but at 
the same time we are, qua our mortal bodies, subject to the random necessity of contingent 
matter (Timaeus 68e; 69d). Regarding our moral situation, we are thus always already ‘fallen’ 
in the sense that we are blinded by the finite shadows of eternal perfection but interpret the 
shadows within our restricted vision as a true picture of reality, and we are always already 
further away from the real than the Demiurge (recall the Cave).   
In her writings, Murdoch suggests that the Demiurge can be interpreted as the ideal 
artist (i.e. not like the ones criticised by Plato), who imposes form on the random contingent 
matter and is thereby able to ‘reduce disharmony’ by creating in accordance with the Good 
(FS, 436). Although the world is subject to the negative necessary causality mentioned above, 
it is also redeemed by the creative eros-love, which confers some degree of order and harmony 
on the world: “This creation myth [Timaeus] represents in the most elegant way the redemption 
of all particular things which are, although made of contingent stuff, touched and handled by 
the divine” (MGM, 477). Following Antonaccio (2012, 194), I suggest that this is the sense in 
which Murdoch’s ontology can be read as affirmative, although of course in a very different 
sense to what we saw in Løgstrup. It is not merely human consciousness, but the whole of 
creation which is illuminated and ‘redeemed’ by being pierced by the light of the Good. 
Furthermore, the human being is, qua the unifying aspect of consciousness, a reflection of the 
divine artist, and the good artist is thus capable of a similar redemption of particular reality by 
virtue of her ability to attend properly and to see the ‘divine in the necessary’, that is, to see the 
sovereign light of Good in and through contingent particularity:  
 
The light of Good, as truthfulness and justice and love, gives life to reality for the enlightened 
knower. The good man perceives the real world, a true and just seeing of people and human 
institutions, which is also a seeing of the invisible through the visible, the real through the 
apparent, the spiritual beyond the material (MGM, 475). 
 
The Good is what allows us to see, and when we attend to the world we see both rational 
connections and goodness and how these are at the same time disrupted by contingent and 
irreducible particularity and fear. That is, when we attend properly we see reality as it is, and 
through this truthful vision we are (morally) redeemed with insight into the connection between 
goodness and truthful vision (MGM, 474). The world is a mess, but only partly so, and the 
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good person is freed qua her extended ability to orientate herself in a truthful vision of the 
partial coherence (form) of the world and intuit in glimpses the perfect form of the Good. 
 Apart from the affirmative nature of Murdoch’s Platonic ontology, it is now also 
possible to see the obvious religious connotations within the idea of the moral pilgrimage of 
the virtuous individual. I therefore suggest that Antonaccio is right when she suggests that 
Murdoch should rather be read as a genre of ‘spiritual counsel’ than as a failed Christian who 
unsuccessfully tries to avoid the old ‘God’ (Antonaccio 2012, 178). In this regard the Timaeus 
is an important part of the background picture, because it underlines Murdoch’s Greek 
conception of religion and morality as a practical form of spirituality, unlike Løgstrup’s entirely 
descriptive metaphysics that eventually leads to the religious belief in merciful redemption 
from ‘outside’.  
On the other hand, Murdoch remains sensible to the aforementioned assertion that any unity 
within human existence remains within the limits of existence itself (there is nothing outside), 
and this makes it vulnerable to criticism about whether it can be properly understood as religion 
or whether it merely represents a humanistic form of spirituality (Schweiker 2010, 157). In the 
following section, I engage with this critique by connecting it to the question about the absolute 
sovereignty of Good vis-à-vis the reality of death and chance, which also represent the second 
form of necessity mentioned above. Does a conception of religion also need an idea of ultimate 
redemption? Is there no ultimate consolation? And must the Good be sovereign over death and 
chance?  
 
4.1 The problem of Death and Chance  
In Løgstrup, we have seen how continuous creation suspends the ultimate annihilation and 
saves the human being ‘in the end’. Since Murdoch does not work within the framework of 
creatio ex nihilo and annihilation, her conception of the moral significance of human mortality 
is different. In Murdoch, the reality of death and chance is closely connected to her assumption 
that existence as such is pointless. As shown earlier, her assumption is that we are born to die, 
and there is nothing outside existence. Our inescapable mortality is, however, directly 
connected to our experience of the goodness of virtue: “Goodness is connected with the 
acceptance of real death and real chance and real transience and only against the background 
of this acceptance, which is psychologically so difficult, can we understand the full extent of 
what virtue is like” (SoG, 100). As will be clear from what follows, this does not make 
Murdoch an existentialist nihilist, but it rather makes her, I suggest, an austere realist who 
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pleaded for “[s]trong agile realism, which is of course not photographic naturalism, the non-
sentimental, non-meanly-personal imaginative grasp of the subject matter” (FS, 459). What I 
argue in this section is that Murdoch conceives of death and chance as ‘moral pedagogues’ that 
remind us of (selfless) virtue as the only true form of goodness and point out the futility of 
selfish desire (Antonaccio 2012, 196). In order to clarify her position in this regard, I draw on 
parts of Murdoch’s reading of Simone Weil and the connection she makes between love of the 
Good (eros) and the tragic.  
 According to Murdoch, it is through the form of a truthful conception of tragedy that 
we can make sense of the connection between goodness and the acceptance of death and 
chance. The true tragedy does not merely contain evil and suffering, but it exposes us directly 
to our mortality, because most depictions of evil and suffering merely result in ‘the evasion of 
the idea of death’ (MGM, 104). Suffering is only ‘real’ when it does not conceal the 
significance of death, e.g., through the consoling (Christian) circumscription of death in terms 
of redemptive suffering (MGM, 119). The importance of death in tragedy is connected to its 
ability to reveal the truth about our condition: “Death threatens the ego’s dream of eternal life 
and happiness and power. Tragedy, like religion, must break the ego, destroying the illusory 
whole of the unified self” (MGM, 104). The reality of death thus reveals to us that we are 
subject to the second form of necessity mentioned in connection with the Timaeus, that is, we 
are subject to the ‘pointless necessity of the world’, and if we reflect, we see how the world 
itself must obey this ‘alien law’ of contingency (MGM, 108). This realisation is the experience 
of void, and it is what the true tragedy should depict. Murdoch’s own example of a true tragedy 
is Shakespeare’s King Lear, because of its austerity and lack of any (fake) consolation. It 
represents a truthful vision where “evil is justly judged and misery candidly surveyed” (MGM, 
104).  
 Murdoch connects the realisation of our radical mortality and frailty to the purifying 
source of the Good. In this way, she rejects Wittgenstein’s stoicism and Sartre’s nihilism by 
drawing on some of Simone Weil’s central insights about how acceptance of death and real 
suffering is a source for purification of our life energy, our eros. In accordance with the 
negative form of necessity in the Timaeus, Weil also emphasises the finality of death and 
suffering by describing them as finalities that demand our obedience (MGM, 106). Recalling 
the previous analysis of Weil’s conception of the Good (God) as a finality without end, we can 
now make sense of how obedience to suffering can lead us to obedience to the Good, which 
constitutes the divine form of necessity to which we are also subjected: “The suffering which 
goes hand in hand with necessity leads us to finality without end. That is why the spectacle of 
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human misery is beautiful” (MGM, 106). Murdoch further suggests that Weil’s connection of 
real suffering and beauty can lead to the use of tragedy as an image of our condition as (erotic) 
creatures, stretched between unconditional mortality and the equally unconditional eternal 
Good (MGM, 106). In this way, our acceptance of our radical mortality points beyond towards 
the divine necessity of the Good, and exposes to us the vanity of selfishness (we will eventually 
die) in the light of eternal goodness (virtue). This is the sense in which, Murdoch argues, 
“Simone Weil’s obedience is realism exposed to good” (MGM, 111).  
 Naturally, this is a very different conception of death and contingency, with very 
different implications, to those that we saw in Løgstrup. Most important is, I suggest, the 
different status of the absolute moral ground in the two thinkers. In Løgstrup, the divine power 
of creation was the ultimate redeemer from annihilation, whereas in Murdoch, the Good does 
not remove death. The Good is merely one necessary aspect vis-à-vis death as an equally 
necessary aspect of existence. The Good is thus morally sovereign as the necessary 
precondition for our moral lives, but this does not make it omnipotent. Murdoch compares her 
own realism with the Christian tradition and simply claims: “The image of a morally perfect 
but not all-powerful Goodness seems to me better to express some ultimate (inexplicable) truth 
about our condition” (FS, 431). This statement anticipates Schweiker's critique of the limits of 
Murdoch’s metaphysics in an article engaging Murdoch’s connection of art and morality.23 
Schweiker asks whether the inner meaning of genuine love can be fully unfolded within an 
‘immanent’ metaphysics which claims that the necessary goodness of life (virtue) is fully 
revealed by the realisation of the necessity of death. He is uneasy about a metaphysics that does 
not go beyond the ‘immanent transcendence’ of the Good which pierces the human world from 
within the human world and makes the acceptance of death the background of the goodness of 
virtue (Schweiker 2012, 157).  Schweiker insists, as Løgstrup probably would too, that the 
goodness of life must ultimately be based not on the acceptance of death but on the ‘conviction 
about the gift of life’, that is, on the omnipotent power of divine love (God) (Schweiker 2012, 
158). Of course, Schweiker’s critique only makes sense from a Christian point of view, and he 
is naturally aware of this. The important aspect of Schweiker’s critical assessment is however 
that it makes it possible to assess Murdoch’s ‘religious’ position on her own terms. Naturally, 
Schweiker avoids placing Murdoch’s religious sensibility as an expression of failed 
Christianity, and instead he places her within a broader field of Greek inspired neo-humanism. 
However, he emphasises how she ultimately also goes beyond contemporary neo-humanism 
                                                        
23 See Schweiker (2010) 
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because of her insistence on our ‘supersensible destiny’ and ‘the transcendence of the Good’ 
(Schweiker 2010, 158). This distinction is important, I contend, because it emphasises 
Murdoch’s religious sensibility as rooted in a different tradition to the common western theism, 
and her constant and subtle movement between the ‘sacred and the profane’, between spiritual-
metaphysical reflection and simple empiricism. In this way, Murdoch insists (along with Plato 
and the Buddhists) that it is possible to talk about religion without theism and without any final 
and ultimate redemption.  
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5.0 Conclusion 
In this comparative study, I have aimed to show some important connections and differences 
between Løgstrup’s and Murdoch’s moral philosophies. In the introduction I put forward three 
aspects, with which, I suggested, it is possible to show the most important similarities and 
differences in the two philosophies. I shall, in conclusion, sum up the results of the analyses of 
these aspects throughout the thesis.  
 In connection with the first aspect, regarding the two-way-movement between 
empiricism and metaphysics, I have shown how both Murdoch and Løgstrup want to retrieve 
metaphysical reflection into the field of moral philosophy, but with careful attention to the 
irreducibility of the particular situation and particular other person. Through their 
phenomenological approach to actual moral experiences, they are both anxious to avoid their 
metaphysical sensibility slipping into dogmatism or totalizing systems. Their investigations of 
universal traits inherent in existences are thus always interpretations (Løgstrup) or mythical 
metaphors (Murdoch) that take departure in specific familiar moral experiences. The approach 
being very similar, we have also seen how their choices of ethical experiences and metaphysical 
frameworks differ in very important ways. They both work with love and love of the other as 
central concepts in moral philosophy, but whereas Løgstrup focuses on trust as a given 
precondition for our moral lives, Murdoch focuses on virtues as examples of what we should 
ideally strive for. I have argued that their respective choice of focus regarding empirical 
phenomena is closely connected to their metaphysical frameworks, Christian and Platonic 
respectively, which differ regarding their understatings of love as the basis for human morality. 
This means, I suggest, that despite the fact that both describe their choice of moral phenomena 
as representing selfless care for the other, one must pay attention to the fact that Murdoch’s 
thought is a defence of human morality as eros-love, whereas Løgstrup builds his conception 
of human morality strictly on goodness as agape-love.  
 In connection with the second aspect, regarding the inherent moral demand in both 
thinkers, I have shown how both regard the moral qualification of existence to include an 
absolute and ubiquitous moral demand. In both, the demand is a demand of selfless love of the 
other, which is nevertheless ultimately unfulfillable because of the ‘fallen’ status of the human 
being. In this regard they thus also initially seem very similar. However, the important 
difference, I contend, is the direction of movement regarding the unfulfillability. In Løgstrup, 
the demand is unfulfillable because it has already been transgressed the moment it is heard, 
and there is thus nothing we can do as we go forward to ‘make ourselves better’. As Rabjerg 
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points out, Løgstrup’s ethics is ultimately not concerned with what we should do but with the 
goodness we have always already been given by virtue of the sovereign expressions of life 
(Rabjerg 2017, 101). In contrast, the demand in Murdoch is unfulfillable because of the 
impossibility of ever becoming an ideal moral agent, but in this case this is because the demand 
is a magnet ahead of us towards which we are drawn and towards which we are demanded to 
redirect our desires as we move forward. In this way, Murdoch’s ethics focuses on what we 
ought to do, because moral goodness is something we must learn. The Greeks of course called 
this movement a recollection of the Forms (anamnesis), but although this indicates a movement 
‘backwards’, it is nevertheless a movement we make by virtue of our eros-passion that reaches 
upwards and onwards in life.  
 Lastly, regarding the religious aspect of ethics, I have shown how both Murdoch’s and 
Løgstrup’s conceptions of human morality include a certain religious sensibility. We have seen 
how Murdoch’s conception of religion implies that morality is an inner spiritual journey 
towards a clearer vision of reality. Her philosophy is thus a practical ‘philosophy-to-live-by’, 
which ultimately involves belief in the sovereign Good as the proper object of our attention. In 
contrast, Løgstrup’s conception of the connection between religion and ethics retains a 
distinction between universal metaphysical description of existence as morally qualified on the 
one hand, and the Christian belief in and hope for salvation ‘from outside’ on the other. In this 
way, I contend, the important difference between the eros- and agape-structure in the two 
thinkers is manifest at this level too.   
 Because of the very different points of departure in Murdoch and Løgstrup, it is hard to 
give any clear cut answer as to which position offers a better resource for moral thinking today. 
Both thinkers use recognisable everyday moral experiences as starting points, and, I contend, 
both Løgstrup’s analysis of the inherent goodness of trust as something which is always already 
there and Murdoch’s analysis of our experience of goodness as actively purified desire are 
convincing and challenging. Because of the difference between their metaphysical framings 
and the consequences they have for their anthropologies, I do not see it as possible to merge 
the two views into one moral philosophy that combines givenness in Løgstrup’s sense and 
active purification in Murdoch’s sense. Ultimately, I suggest, one can draw on the resources 
from both thinkers, but one must keep in mind that this implicates that one switches between 
fundamental frameworks in doing so. We can never prove or know who is right in this matter, 
but we can keep reflecting, looking, and asking. However, I suggest, Murdoch’s practical 
philosophy with its emphasis on the importance of careful and selfless attention is an important 
resource for reflection for our age. We are constantly overloaded with enormous amounts of 
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information from all over the world (the internet), and the continuous flow of advertisements 
on our smartphones, computers and TV’s often draw our attention to what is easy and 
pleasurable and away from what is difficult and valuable. With the idea of attention as a central 
moral concept, Murdoch’s thought can help us reflect upon the value and importance of active 
attention to reality (especially other people) and remind us of the vanity of fear, selfishness and 
cheap pleasures. We too often see the world and others as we want to see them, and we tend to 
avoid trying to really attend to others. In our rushed modern lives we need to slow down and 
look and listen in order not forget that to see and to be seen is one of the most valuable things 
in life.  
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